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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Research Question and Systematic Approach 
 
In literature about state failure in Africa, Rwanda is often mentioned along  with 
countries like the DRC or Somalia, as an example for a failed state. 
Rwanda obviously presents features that make it seem like a case typical of a 
weak state or even a failed one. But was Rwanda really a failed state prior to 
genocide? 
The question that then presents itself when looking closer into the theories of 
genocide is, if a failed state can really be the scene for a genocide of this 
dimension. This is what shall be analyzed and answered with this thesis. 
One of the main objectives of this paper is to analyze whether the Rwandan state 
already was a failed state prior to the genocide or not. This question shall be 
answered by looking at the theories of state failure and genocide thoroughly. 
By researching certain factors that are considered to be a sign of state failure, this 
paper shall give an answer to the question if state failure in Rwanda followed or 
preceded the genocide, or if genocide – since it is defined as a state controlled 
event – excludes state failure.  
The main goal of this paper is to analyze necessary events and criteria that are 
then succeeded by state weakness or failure. These criteria will then be examined 
and put into relation to the tragic events that happened during the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994.  
These events will be shown on the example of the Rwandan media, not only 
because the Rwandan media played an important role in the genocide that was 
about to happen and also while it happened, but also because the hate media in 
Rwanda were directly linked to the government, the same government that was 
responsible for planning and executing the Rwandan genocide. Moreover the role 
of the media in Rwanda is especially interesting, since it is considered one of the 
roots of the extreme explosion of violence and killings in the small Central 
African state.  
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Another fact that makes the Rwandan hate media particularly interesting for this 
paper is the fact that they have been well documented due to the fact that the 
ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) decided to take a closer look 
at the role of the media and those responsible and linked it directly to the acts of 
genocide that took place. 
This paper seeks to link external and internal developments that might be 
considered major factors for the Rwandan genocide.  
The first part of the paper concentrates on analyzing state failure and political 
theories that deal with weak states, whereas the second part of the paper gives an 
overview of the events, with – as already mentioned – a focus on the role of the 
media.  
In the final chapter of this paper I will connect the events of state failure and state 
collapse with the events during the Rwandan genocide and seek to relate these 
factors with each other. 
 
1.2. The Rwandan Genocide 
 
When in late 1994 the whole extent of the massacres that had taken place in 
Rwanda between April and July 1994 became public, the world was stunned with 
horror. Following the disbelief and shock about the atrocities that had happened in 
the small Central African Republic inculpation started. Mixed with the disbelief 
about the tragedy of the genocide came the blame, since nothing really had been 
done to avert or end the killings. It was not the first time that the words: „Never 
again!“ were uttered and new research groups to avoid such events in the future 
were called for. 
It cannot be denied that genocide is a worldwide danger, not restricted to a single 
continent, which has been shown by history, especially the history of the 20th 
century. Rwanda was not the first time one was confronted with such a tragedy.  
As early as in late 1994 the ad-hoc Tribunal for Rwanda was set up in Arusha, 
Tanzania by the UN Security Council (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda – ICTR). This tribunal is trying to judge the main figures of the 1994 
genocide up to now. Rwanda furthermore installed the – quite controversial – 
Gacaca-Courts in order to deal with thealleged participants of the genocide on a 
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regional basis. Until today the Rwandan prisons are filled with possible 
participators of the genocide, awaiting their trial. 
Next to the ICTR and the local courts that are still trying to process the elements 
of crime during the months of genocide, more and more scientists have started to 
research the obvious questions, asking about the „Why?“ and „How?“, of the 
massacres; questions, which – if at all – cannot easily be answered.  
Furthermore, one of the main factors that have been recognized in the last years of 
discourse is the issue of the anti-Tutsi propaganda that had been enforced by the 
Hutu extremists (génocidaires), an issue that, as already mentioned, will also be 
addressed in this paper thoroughly.  
The focus will especially be on the Kangura newspaper and the radio station 
„Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines“ (short: RTLM, sometimes in 
literature also referred to as RTLMC). Both of the media identified here had 
launched campaigns against the Tutsi minority, also including all the Hutus that 
were affiliated with Tutsis in official or private matters; defining the population 
group that was to become the victim of the following atrocities. Even the ICTR 
found these media guilty of genocide and tried four people on that account. Three 
of whom in the so called „Media Trials“ and another one separately. All four of 
them were found guilty of the propagation of hate speech and of playing a major 
part not only in the planning but also the execution of the genocide. 
The initial portrayal of the conflict as a simple civil war in the international media 
does not uphold a closer examination of the events.  
The causes of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda root deep in Rwandan history. Many 
articles have been events written about these potential reasons. That is why in the 
following paper the causes that culminated in the genocide shall be researched 
under the perspective of the theories of state failure. The paper shall analyze what 
features of state failure Rwanda had developed until the outbreak of the killings in 
1994 and how they were related to the genocide.  
 
1.3. African States between Democracy and State Failure 
 
The notion of a modern state in Sub-Sahara Africa is relatively young, especially 
since before 1950 only Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa were recognized as 
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independent states, while the rest of the Sub-Saharan states gained their 
independence only after the 1960s (ACPCC, 2005).  
This part of the paper analyzes certain developments that have taken place on the 
African continent during the last decades up to now. When referred to Africa in 
general hereafter, it is thought of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA); except when it is 
explicitly stated otherwise. The main focus is to be put on certain phenomena that 
can be identified in the SSA-region, namely the issue of state failure and the 
criteria that led to those events. In the past years state failure has become a 
keyword when it is referred to the many shortcomings of the African states.  
In the beginning it has to be noted, however that in the last decades considerable 
progress has been made, especially in Southern Africa and many Western African 
countries, such as Mali, Benin or South Africa. These accomplishments shall 
neither be forgotten nor negated, but will not be the main focus of this paper.  
It is much more thought to discover certain factors and events that may lead to the 
extreme event of state failure or even genocide, as it took place in Rwanda.  
 
“Democratic forms of governance were generally few and short-lived 
through the decolonialization and Cold War periods; most African 
regimes were autocratic and well over half of African regimes were ruled 
by ethnically exclusive political elites.” (ACPCC, 2005:2) 
 
In 2004 there were only 5 autocratic regimes identified (out of 43 states), whilst in 
1989 36 out of 41 countries were considered to have autocratic regimes. 
Next to the accomplishments that led to democratic developments and transitions 
in some African states, there are four main criteria to be identified that block or 
even decline any indication of democracy and development and leave the 
countries in an abominable state.  
Furthermore, it has to be noted that most regimes in Africa nowadays are 
identified as mixed regimes with democratic as well as autocratic features. Only 
about 13 countries were identified as democratic states in 2004, since “The 
problem of extreme failures of states doubled in the 1990s, affecting about 10% of 
African countries.” (ACPCC, 2005:3). 
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The following criteria are considered to weaken many African states: 
 
- Political violence, civil wars and bloody conflicts between ethnic and 
religious groups, which can even culminate in genocides or so called 
politicides (political mass murder). 
- Stagnating or declining economies, low investments and exploding state 
debts, followed or preceded by high unemployment rates and a growing 
black economy, as well as organized crime. 
- The explosion of the AIDS/HIV-pandemic (as well as others), destroying 
whole regions as well as “human capital”, leaving thousands dead each 
year, will pose a serious threat to the economies of many African nations 
in the future. 
- And finally the growing tendencies of state failure, state collapse and state 
decay (also referred to as the “Apocalyptic Trias” in this paper), three 
events that will be thoroughly discussed in this paper  
(Tetzlaff, 2002) 
 
These four factors can be related to one another; in many cases they reciprocate 
each other. Still, the most destructive form is to be found within the collective – 
and often politically motivated – violence, often brutally uleashed, that unsettles 
many African states. On the other hand, interstate conflicts are not to be found 
very often, with some very bloody exceptions like the war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, or the so called African World War that involved eight nations in the 
Great Lakes Region and cost millions of lives, mainly in the eastern province of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kivu, a war that was fought especially 
brutally over the vast natural resources that are situated in that region (Tetzlaff, 
2002). 
 
Still, at the beginning of the new millennium 13 of the worldwide 35 civil wars 
took place in Africa and another 12 violent inner-state conflicts were identified 
there.  
The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 has to be considered one of the 
biggest catastrophes of the last decades. The killings lasted a hundred days and 
left an estimated 800.000 people dead (Tetzlaff, 2002).  
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2. State Failure 
 
 
2.1. The Theory of State Failure 
 
Finding a single definition that thoroughly describes the multitude of theories on 
failing and failed states is not really easy, especially when talking about 
developing or so-called “Third World” countries. There are multiple theories 
concerning the issue, but not a specific one that is universally recognized. 
The lack of development has, for many years, been blamed mainly on economic 
conditions. This is why the criticism that was raised was especially directed 
against the dependencia theory and modernization theory. The not only non-
existent, even negative development of most countries in Sub-Sahara Africa 
therefore cannot be accounted for atisfactorily with these development theories 
(Wimmer 2000). 
Since then, the theories of failing and failed states have become sort of a “catch-
all concept” describing the various shortcomings in the development theories for 
the negative development throughout the “Third World”. 
Reading papers and materials concerning the topic of failed states and state failure, 
most of the theories name the same or similar aspects that most of the times differ 
only slightly from each other. In the following paper the author will give an 
overview of the most important appendages that are important in the context of 
the topic of this paper. 
 
 
2.2.  Approaching the Theory of State Failure 
 
One of the main issues that have to be clarified at the beginning is the meaning of 
the concept of “state”. There are two quite different approaches to be found in the 
discourse of failing and collapsed states, which build on either the Lockean or the 
Weberian definition of state (Eriksen, 2006:1). 
Furthermore, the view of how countries in the “Third World” should address their 
future has changed throughout time. While modernization theory during the 1960s 
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considered the state as the vital actor in its developmental efforts, this perception 
changed in the 1980s and 1990s, when more neo-liberal theories entered the 
development discourse. Many states in the “Third World” by then were identified 
with kleptocratic features like corruption and organized crime, as well as serious 
problems in being bureaucratically inefficient. The most obvious changes in the 
strategies concerning development that mirrored this alteration of perception were 
the neo-liberal structural adjustment programs (Eriksen 2003). 
 
Highly recognized authors like Zartman and Rotberg have used the Lockean 
perception of the state, which is a quite ideological approach and not really useful 
in the following discourse on state failure, since by this definition the state is 
considered a service provider and as soon as it becomes impossible for the state to 
provide all the services, it can be identified as a collapsed state- an approach that 
by definition includes many states in the concept of state failure, because these 
services include not only the assurance of security, but also political participation, 
infrastructural as well as social services in the area of health and education. 
Eriksen considers this perception of the state “… more ideological than analytical 
useful.” (Eriksen, 2006:3). This builds on Rotberg’s perception of the state where 
Rotberg, as explained earlier, defines the failure of statehood on account of the 
inability to provide certain goods and features to its citizens (Eriksen, 2006:2ff). 
Eriksen criticizes that if the state does not cope with all these responsibilities, one 
cannot really call it a collapsed state yet, since the definition of failure used by the 
authors Zartman and Rotberg would imply that most of the states could be 
classified as collapsed states, including many of the western states. 
On that account a discussion in this discourse has taken place, marking certain 
gradations in the effectiveness of statehood and defining strong, weak, failing and 
failed states (Eriksen, 2006:3). 
One also has to take into consideration that the rise of the modern state in Europe 
was not really aligned to the providing of services to its inhabitants in the 
beginning either, but more to the correlation of the militarization of rivalries 
between European despots. Only in the following development were 
administrative adjustments pursued by the state, in order to provide the basis to 
collect taxes and create a functional financial structure to account for certain 
expenses (Eriksen, 2006:4). 
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The other approach, as already mentioned above, is designed on the Weberian 
concept of “state”, where the state is the institution executing effective monopoly 
of power over its political territory. Only the collapse of this ability – of 
maintaining power over its territory – would define a state as a failed one. 
In addition to this definition of the state’s monopoly of power in the discourse of 
failed state theories, Jackson, Krasner and Giddens add the failure of pacification 
within the state as a means of measurement (Eriksen, 2006:4). 
 
Another important aspect that needs to be clarified at the beginning of this paper 
is the term “failed state” or “failing state”, since the term of “failed state” implies 
there had to be an effective state to begin with. But there are so far no examples of 
failed or failing states, where the state addressed its responsibilities effectively 
before the collapse (Clapham 2000, Lange 2004, Eriksen 2006). Clapham 
criticized, that: ” … ‘failed state’ is one of those unsatisfactory categories that is named after 
what it isn’t, rather than what it is.” (Clapham 2000:1). 
Many states, especially through the process of decolonialization, became states 
only by being engaged in diplomatic relations with other states, but with no 
feature of having executive power over their territory. Moreover, lots of them 
have never possessed any necessary attributes of a functioning state whatsoever. 
This would by definition include the possibility to secure and execute a 
universally valid legal system or even security for its inhabitants – considering 
internal, as well as external security. On the contrary, many regimes that seized 
power after independence used this illusiveness of national sovereignty to 
exculpate them from their political actions to any outside criticism (Lange, 
2004:1). 
Lange adds furthermore that nation-building in the former colonies is a very 
complex process that is always influenced by external as well as internal factors. 
He states that many countries hitherto have not been able to develop a social, 
economic and at the same time a political system, since these adjustments rely on 
a certain stability within the country (Lange 2004). 
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2.3. Factors for State Failure 
 
The collapse of a country mostly entails the partial or complete collapse of the 
country’s economy and existing state structures, at least these that still existed 
before the collapse. Likewise it connotes the breakdown of state authority, 
especially in countries where the governments only possess little or no legitimacy 
or competence to govern the country. These states can in many cases be 
associated with rampant criminality, armed conflicts, serious violations of human 
rights or/and a humanitarian crisis. In most of the cases these countries and their 
collapse, often accompanied by an all-consuming wave of violence, constitute a 
serious threat to the whole region (Kassem 2004, Fituni 2004). 
Assad Durani states that with the collapse of these state-assigned responsibilities 
existing clan structures might take over in order to provide for the basic needs of 
the population. These structures were to be found in Afghanistan (Durani 
2004:22ff) as well as in the Rwandan refugee camps. In response to the collapse 
of the economy the underground economy is also flourishing, which leads to the 
problem that without state supervision and regulation there are no taxes to rebuild 
the collapsed state economy. In most cases financial aid of donor countries is 
necessary, but it is prevalently not effective, since these financial sources ooze 
away into inefficient and in many cases corrupt state machinery, especially in 
countries that possess vast natural resources (Durani 2004). 
In the case of Rwanda, the institution of the state was never really favored by the 
Rwandan people, since in the beginning it stood for the brutal colonial regime of 
the Belgians and after independence for the discriminating Rwandan Hutu-regime. 
 
Nation states exist to ensure certain securities and needs for its inhabitants and, 
depending on its ability and level to perform these services, can be evaluated as 
strong, weak, failing or failed states (Kassem 2004, Abramova 2004). 
Furthermore, Kassem (2004) creates a hierarchic structures classification of the 
importance of a desideratum that can be ensured by the state. These structures 
include basic securities such as safety within a country and against outside threats, 
enforceable and actionable justice structures and laws, as well as basic needs like 
infrastructure, accessible health- and educational systems. These fundamental 
securities can be endangered in a state where neo-patrimonial structures weaken 
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governmental requirements and block further development (Kassem 2004:38ff; 
Abramova 2004:47f). The concept of neo-patrimonialism mentioned here will be 
addressed more thoroughly later in this paper. 
 
 
2.3.1. Why do states collapse? 
 
As already mentioned before, there is a wide range of various reasons that can be 
found in the literature on state failure, with a very broad range of views on what 
triggers a states collapse.  
Fituni (2004) for example considers capitalism and the pressure that results of it 
major factors for state failure, especially when western fiscal institutions impose 
their conditions on those weak countries. Fituni also identifies neo-patrimonial 
structures as one of the main reasons, though market failure is considered 
especially important by him. Therefore he names patterns like privatization, 
structural adjustments or economy measures as activators of economic stagnation 
and/or failure, growing violence through government forces as well as the 
explosion of socio-economic costs (Fituni 2004). 
It becomes obvious that the idea of the state as a functioning main actor and 
regulator concerning countries’ economic and social development had to be 
abandoned for many countries; especially in Africa many countries in Sub-
Saharan-Africa could not even be considered Third World countries anymore. 
Finally the inefficiency of the state sector became highly visible and the 
incompetence of many African political leaders made it impossible for most 
countries to cope with the challenges of decolonialization, leaving them highly 
vulnerable in aspects of political, social and economic demands. Especially in 
Africa, since the “historic” leaders were replaced by new power elites, politics has 
become the battle field for absolute power. The group that received it, either 
through elections or through force, this group in most cases intended to keep it, 
leaving other problems like ethnic conflicts unattended, or worse, even used it for 
its own purposes. The creation of small power elites, in many cases colliding with 
the oppression of all the other social groups, created or deepened the crater of 
psychosocial differences.  
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Changes in the developmental theories and strategies of the west and the 
emergence of neo-liberalism made it even easier for plutocratic governments to 
use their power for their own purposes, being the perfect breeding ground for 
organized crime, kleptocracy and clientelism (Abramova 2004). These weak, 
failing or failed states often yield large financial profits, especially if the countries 
own vast natural resources. Hence these profits are only reserved to criminal 
organizations and some privileged elites in the country, who therefore adopt 
arbitrary laws in order to maximize their own profits.  
In a failed state there is a power vacuum, which means that real social and 
political needs of the civil population can only be seconded on an ad-hoc and 
private basis (Kassem 2004). 
Kassem (2004) additionally defines three fundamental, geopolitical factors that he 
considers activators for state failure. First he names colonialism, wherever it 
destroyed traditional structures without implementing effective constitutional 
structures instead. Without these foundations no national identities could build on 
that and the industrial revolution could not take place in these countries. Here 
important examples are above all the Levantine states. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of the dictatorial regimes 
that had been backed by one of the superpowers without having any legitimacy to 
be in power.  
Additionally these countries had been militarized through armament supplies, 
leaving vast parts of Africa heavily armed. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall democratic systems were not useful for many 
dictators and one-party governments throughout Africa. Polls were simply not 
accepted when it meant a reduction or loss of power for the regimes.  
In addition, many of them had no scruples whatsoever to use violence against 
anyone opposing their regime. Kassem thinks that contrary to the problem of the 
20th century, when only a few countries had too much power, the problem of the 
21st century is that too many countries have too little power (Kassem 2004:40).  
 
Finally Kassem also names the process of modernization as one of the triggers of 
state failure. These new developments provide more mobility, socially as well as 
geographically, but for weak states the necessary process of stabilization cannot 
be provided (Kassem 2004:41). 
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One of the main occurrences that precede state failure is the lack of ability of a 
state to conserve the monopoly to force – within as well as beyond state territory. 
Reasons for the lack of competence can be internal violent conflicts, the 
emergence of non-state forces, black marketing, often in correlation with arms 
trade and the illegal exploitation of resources, in many cases leading to an 
armament of major parts of the civil society.  
These developments most times go hand in hand with corrupt regimes and their 
struggle for power, a combination that makes a country veer from one catastrophe 
to the next (Kassem 2004:41). 
Tragically in many cases single characters can be pointed out to be responsible for 
the collapse of a whole state, famous examples being Mobutu SeSe Seko of Zaire, 
Siad Barré in Somalia or Liberia´s Samuel Doe, just to name a few. All of them 
had constricted all forms of democratic achievements, since these were considered 
dangerous to their own power. Their positions of power were promoted and 
secured by neo-patrimonial features like personality cults and clientelism, as well 
as kleptocratic features and, in all cases, horrible violations of basic human rights.  
 
When all these existing and hitherto weak governmental institutions finally 
collapse, the whole state, as a consequence, goes as well. With the collapse of all 
state features the brutality and intensity of violence increases even further, and the 
whole society lapses, as Kassem puts it, into a form of collective insanity (Kassem 
2004:41).  
Furthermore, Kassem defines momentum and a high degree of incalculability as 
characteristic features of these internal conflicts, in many cases attaining a 
stringent level of systematically radicalized and politicized violence. State 
collapse is preceded by the decay of power structures that originally should 
preserve law and order. The triggers for these phenomena can be manifold: 
poverty, ethnic as well as social tensions, exploitation, incapable authorities, 
malicious intrusion through outside actors and the neglect of the development of 
certain relevant sectors, just to name a few. The real power is culminated outside 
the governmental centre, which is unable to act because of numerous power 
struggles. In many of the African countries, e.g. the DRC, local forces sense their 
chance and seize power. This is followed by a dramatic loss of control for the 
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present government, which is trying to keep the power within its own entourage, 
which can consist of ethnic, regional or religious affiliations, or even functional 
networks like military squads. 
Ultimately, these minority groups concentrate on their own needs and vantages, 
while oppressing the needs of the majority. Decisions and necessary measures that 
are not primarily in the interest of their own entourage, or might reduce their own 
power, are not taken, due to lack of political will or audacity. State failure 
becomes inevitable when the centre loses control over its own authorities, which 
start to act on their own terms, corrupting capital and using law and order in their 
own personal interest. 
Once more, one of the most vivid examples for plutocratic features is the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under Mobutu’s reign public property and 
state finances were plundered, development aid payments were transferred to 
private accounts, leaving all infrastructures in ruins (Abramova 2004:48). 
The collapse mostly culminates in the eruption of anarchic, violent conflicts, and 
in many cases includes the destruction of the last remaining infrastructures; 
usually leaving the educational elites, opposition, as well as experts, dead or 
fleeing the country (Kassem 2004). In Rwanda this included the opposition, 
doctors, teachers, priests, the Tutsi population and in parts also the Hutu elites. 
 
Africa, with its about 3.000 different tribes and about 1.000 different languages, 
developes in the direction of being especially complicated while forming some 
kind of minefield for ethnic divisions and conflicts. Especially since the 1980, the 
political elites have started to compartmentalize on account of ethnic affiliation. In 
the following years the polarization between ethnic groups acuminated into ethno-
nationalism, marking the 1990s with a series of bloody conflicts, not only in 
Rwanda, but also Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad, Nigeria, … (Abramova 
2004:53ff). 
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2.3.2. Using Erdmann’s “Apocalyptic Trias” 
 
Erdmann is defines three stages of a failing state that seem useful to analyze 
events in SSA countries, especially since he adapted his theories especially to 
African countries. His theories find that these three stages often follow each other, 
since massive state failure often leads to the decay of the state and, in the worst 
case, to its collapse. This progression is not mandatory, though; one stage is not 
necessarily followed by the other (Erdmann 2003). 
 
• State failure (Staatsversagen): 
State failure includes structural activity and achievement deficits of the state, 
without constricting its monopoly of power or sovereignty over its territory and 
inhabitants lastingly. These developments inevitably lead to a lack of legitimacy 
of the country, which can concern the legitimacy of the government, the regime or 
the whole state. This stage of state failure includes the collapse of public 
infrastructures, such as educational and health systems, problems of the 
implementation of general administrative issues due to endemic corruption, as 
well as the rampant decay of physical infrastructures, exploding crime rate and the 
repression of the monopoly on the use of force. 
Almost all of the SSA countries can be included in this category (Erdmann 
2003:271). 
 
• State decay (Staatsverfall): 
The stage of state decay follows the stage of state failure. Per definition of 
Erdmann, state decay includes the loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the 
state over a certain territory. This happens without questioning the legitimacy of 
the state, so without the intention of secession, while some sort of parastatehood 
develops (“Parastaatlichkeit”), taking over some or most of the state services, 
creating a process of informalization and decentralization (Erdmann 2003:271). 
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• State collapse (Staatszerfall): 
State collapse describes the complete collapse of state authority. Here, we have to 
distinguish between two different types of state collapse. 
a. Partial state collapse: This connotes the loss of power over parts of the 
state territory, accompanied by the decay of the legitimacy of the state 
and the complete loss of state power. This form of state collapse is 
found in countries that are shackled by civil wars (e.g. Angola, Sudan, 
Burundi, etc.). While the government still controls substantial parts of 
the territory and is even able to fight against the aggressor in the 
country, the monopoly of power in these parts is only nominal, giving 
way to features of a parastatehood (Erdmann 2003:272). 
b. Absolute state collapse: Means that in a country there is no or only a 
minimum of a central instance left, controlling only a small part of the 
state territory. Best examples are Somalia up to now, or Liberia during 
the war (Erdmann 2003:272). 
 
 
2.3.3. Ethnicity as a Trigger for Violence? 
 
The topic of ethnicity as one of the root causes of conflicts in Africa is a vast topic 
that in order to go into detail would require a whole paper alone. Since when one 
is talking about Rwanda, the issue of ethnicity is inescapable, I will address it, but 
without being able of going into too much detail. 
Ethnicity seems to have become one of the main reasons for violence today. 
“Ethnic conflicts” are all over the news. Violent conflicts and internal fighting are 
more and more often blamed on “ethnic differences”, leaving other possible 
reasons unattended or even concealing the real issues (Schlee 2006). In respect of 
state failure, with the process of the disintegration of governmental control, the 
allegiance of the population towards the state declines as well. When the cohesion 
between the state and its society vanishes, people try to find other terms to 
identify themselves with others. This can be through language, religion, or often 
through ethnicity (Langfold, 1999.62). 
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„’Ethnische Konflikte’ ist, besonders seit dem Ende des Sozialismus und 
der Abkehr von einer klassenkämpferischen Perspektive, zu einer 
selbstverständlichen Phrase geworden. Keiner fragt was eigentlich 
ethnisch an ethnischen Konflikten ist. (…) Ethnizität ist in dieser Sicht 
ein zeitkonstanter Faktor, der Konflikte generiert.“ (Schlee 2006:8). 
 
Schlee especially criticizes the view that in an ethnic conflict „…uralte und tief 
verwurzelte Gegensätze…“ (Schlee 2006:12) collide with each other. He finds that 
ethnicity is nothing that can be considered constant and unalterable, since it is 
something that has to be redefined all the time. The concept of ethnicity is not 
only dependent on its cultural contents, but also on the collective of persons 
related to it. These define the range of what is understood by “Us” and “Them” 
continuously anew (Schlee 2006:12). With the shifting of these concepts the 
causes for conflicts and their constellations also change again and again. The 
borders of what is understood as “Us” and “Them” also shift with the standpoint 
of the observer. There are cases in SSA where different tribes, which in extreme 
cases can even belong to a different language family, align to one clan (Schlee 
2006,13ff). These differences are often only created or tightened by political elites 
in order to receive the support of a certain population group or to explain existing 
inequalities (Maquet 1961, Schlee 2006). 
 
„‘Types‘ and ‚traits‘ incautiously and sometimes fancifully ascribed by 
social scientists and bureaucrats have often taken on a terrible social 
reality as the reification and essentialization of cultural difference have 
been harnessed to deadly political visions.” 
(cited in: Igwara, 1995:7). 
 
An obvious example for such a case would be that of the Kalenjin in Kenia: 
 
„Die heutigen alten Leute unter den Kalenjin wussten in ihrer Jugend 
nicht, dass sie Kalenjin waren. Dass diese Kalenjin nicht weiter 
zurückverfolgt werden können als in die Kolonialzeit und dass es 
ursprünglich nur den Gebildeten unter ihnen bekannt war, wie die 
europäischen Linguisten hier die Dialektgrenzen zogen und größeren 
sprachlichen Zusammenhalt definierten, ändert nichts daran, dass die 
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Kalenjin heue eine hoch politisierte Ethnie sind, auch wegen der 
Protektion, die sie unter dem Präsidenten Daniel arap Moi genossen 
haben.“ (Schlee 2006:12). 
 
 
2.3.4. The Impact of the Absence of External Conflicts in Africa 
 
As discussed before, the militarization and armament of many African states 
during and after the Cold War made Africa the main area of conflicts, with 
internal violence in most of the SSA countries during the 1990s. 
But since the fall of the Berlin Wall, dictatorships and military regimes have 
become unfashionable, even in Africa (Pelda, 2007:5). Pelda states that nowadays 
African countries elect their dictators every four to five years, though once in 
power, democratic elections are not always guaranteed by the regime.  
Just a while ago the elections in Nigeria made this obvious once again, even more 
so the recent elections in Zimbabwe in 2008. Democracy does not change the 
style in which African leaders govern their countries too much (Pelda 2007:5). 
Until today, for a vote during the elections in many African countries it is not 
necessary to get as many supporters within the population as possible, but it is 
crucial to gain the support of local clan leaders, thus ensuring the vote of the 
whole area. The support of these clan leaders can either be bought by money or 
promises. Furthermore, since people are poor, votes are usually cheap. 
 
Still, one cannot help but wonder why democratic structures and economic power 
of their country are not of more importance to the African elites and why 
corruption is still growing like an epidemic. 
Pelda, among others, blames the absence of external conflicts as one of the main 
reasons. The danger of external absorption forces a state and its government to 
restrain (neo-) patrimonial structures like corruption to prevent a hostile takeover. 
It has been well documented that in Europe – as history shows – those despots 
who were neglecting their armies or were losing too many taxes into the channels 
of corruption were in danger of being deposed. Statehood then was directly linked 
to warfare. 
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Furthermore, the military tensions between European countries made not only 
military and scientific developments necessary, but despots also had an interest in 
developing such things as property or contract laws. Progress was crucial for a 
country’s survival (Pelda, 2007:5), weak states simply ceased to exist (Eriksen, 
2005:3). 
Moletsi Mbeki, brother of the former South African president even stated that: 
 
”In Europa war die Furcht vor vernichtenden zwischenstaatlichen 
Kriegen ein entscheidender Faktor für die wirtschaftliche Integration des 
Kontinents. Dies ist nicht der Fall in Afrika. Zwischenstaatliche Kriege 
haben in Europa außerdem dazu beigetragen, ein Nationalbewusstsein zu 
entwickeln. Ein solches fehlt hingegen in Afrika weitgehend. Hinzu 
kommt, dass ein Staat mit äußeren Feinden gezwungen ist, sich besser zu 
organisieren, um große Armeen auszurüsten, ohne zugleich die 
wirtschaftliche Produktion absacken zu lassen. Zwischenstaatliche 
Kriege zwingen die Regierungen darüber hinaus, Minderheiten im Land 
Konzessionen zu machen, um eine einheitliche Front im Angesicht der 
äußeren Bedrohung zu schaffen. Die große Zahl der innerstaatlichen 
Konflikte in Afrika hat hingegen eine völlig gegenteilige Wirkung. Sie 
fragmentieren die Gesellschaft, statt sie zu vereinen. Sie untergraben das 
Vertrauen in den Staat und dessen Legitimität. Insgesamt schwächen sie 
den Staat.“ (Pelda, 2007:5). 
 
It can be assumed as obvious that internal conflicts weaken a. It has to be noted 
though, that internal conflicts in Africa – at least in most of the cases– never 
reached the same extent as interstate conflicts in Europe. Most of the times these 
rebel groups control border areas that are of little or no real interest to the regimes 
in the centre, the chance that one of these rebel groups might seize power is very 
slim (Pelda 2007). 
One of these exceptions is the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) in Rwanda, whose  
former leader Paul Kagame became Rwanda’s new president in 2000. The former 
acting president, Pasteur Bizimungu, who was also a member of the RPF, stayed 
in power from the end of the genocide in 1994 until 2000 when Kagame was 
elected with over 90% of the votes. 
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At the end of the 1960s, the Organization of the African Union codified the 
national borders, and the acting heads of the states agreed not to interfere in each 
other’s domestic affairs. Pelda describes this as the emergence of a cartel of the 
powerful with the goal to exploit their own territory as far as possible, discarding 
the violent struggle between former colonies. 
The absence of the effects of conflicts has been thoroughly discussed in the last 
years, by authors such as Luttwalk (“Give war a chance”, 1999), Ottaway (“Keep 
out of Africa”, 1999) and Herbst (“Let them fail”, 2004), as well as in the 
discourse about the failure of humanitarian interventions of (UN) peace keeping 
missions like in Rwanda 1994 or Somalia 1993, just to name the most tragic ones 
(Eriksen 2005). 
 
Thus it has to be noted that there is a discussion going on in the scientific 
community if today’s wars would still have the same nation-strengthening effect 
as they had on Europe. Moreover, the question is raised whether in our 
contemporary world order a state’s survival is still dependent on its (Clapham 
2000, Eriksen 2005). 
 
 
2.3.4.1. Insertion: Can War Still Strengthen States? –  
The Impact of Genocide and the War in the Great Lakes Region on Rwanda 
 
To take a closer look at this discussion, one can look at the war in the Great Lakes 
Region in this context, since Eriksen raises the question in his paper “The Congo 
war and prospects of state formation” if the conflict, which has also been referred 
to as “the African World War”, has had a strengthening effect on Rwanda and 
Uganda.  
In this discourse Rwanda is a special case, since the exodus of millions of 
refugees, among them many of the “génocidaires”, was one of the main reasons 
for the outbreaks of violence in the Democratic Republic Congo (Eriksen 2005). 
While the wars in Europe were mainly about territory, this was not the case in the 
conflict of the Great Lakes Region. Although countries invaded each other’s 
territories, none of the parties ever made any territorial claims.  
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The situation in the Congo represented a serious problem for Rwanda, since the 
refugee camps had become reception points for the Hutu militia, who had vowed 
to take Rwanda back and kill the remaining Tutsi, as well as all the Hutu who 
might support the new Tutsi regime. While Rwanda, alongside Uganda, first 
supported Kabila and acted as his allies in order to overthrow Mobutu, they soon 
changed their position, then supporting the RCD-Goma rebel forces in the eastern 
Congo.  
For Rwanda this decision was based on the reason that Kabila did not – as 
promised – disarm the Hutu militias. Moreover, the presence of these large 
numbers of foreign troops in the Congo made Kabila try to get rid of his former 
allies.  
Therefore Rwanda and Uganda chose to support the RCD-Goma, soon taking over 
control of nearly one third of the territory, and along with this territory also most 
of the vast natural resources located in the DRC. Rwanda proved to be a major 
military player in the region, not only being highly equipped for war after the 
many violent conflicts prior to and also during the genocide, but also the RPF, 
which had invaded Rwanda and seized power during the genocide, was 
considered to be one of the best trained military forces in the area.  
 
Not only was the Rwandan army, which had just waged a major war in Rwanda, 
able to beat Mobutu`s army, which was in poor condition, but later on succeeded 
in driving away the Ugandan forces and taking control over Kisangani city. The 
fact that a tiny country like Rwanda could gain control over such a vast area is not 
only a sign for Rwanda`s military strength, but also for the power vacuum that can 
be found in the DRC (Eriksen 2005). 
Rwanda is also one of the African countries with the highest spending on the 
military sector, using between 4 and 5.5 % of the GDP, placing Rwanda on the 
third place after Angola and Eritrea. Real figures of what is spent on military 
equipment are to be considered much higher, though. Experts measure that 
Rwanda finances its expenditure by exploiting the DRC´s mineral resources.  
 
Despite the external security threats through the Hutu militias, Rwanda is still able 
to control its internal violence. Still, it is not really possible to connect this 
stability to the existence of an external conflict, since before the war Rwanda had 
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also been one of the stable states in the region, especially since the strength of 
today’s Rwandan army had been established before the war and not only after it 
(Eriksen 2005).  
 
Eriksen cites Reyntjens: 
 
“A mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 
1994, the Rwandan state had been rebuilt. Rwanda was again 
administered from top to bottom, territorial, military and security 
structures were in place, the judicial system was re-established; tax 
revenues were collected and spent. The regime was able in a short time 
to establish total control over state and society. … While many other 
African states tend towards state collapse, the Rwandan state has 
reaffirmed itself vigorously (Reyntjens 2004:209).” (Eriksen, 2005:6). 
 
Eriksen (2005) finds that the strength of today’s Rwandan army, the former RPF, 
is to be found in its purpose as well as in the 1994 conflict, where it was the main 
actor to stop the Hutu regime and its militias by invading the country from 
northern Uganda, where it was located.  
Rwanda is also a unique example for the strength and weakness of an African 
state, since it has had a long tradition of statehood leading back to pre-colonial 
times even (Eriksen 2005).  
Another significant feature of the Rwandan state, which has been exploiting 
minerals and other natural resources from the DRC, is that the Rwandan 
government was able to keep a large scale corruption and kleptocracy of its 
officers under control, making the benefits of this exploitation available to its 
country’s economy.  
Furthermore it has to be noted that, as often mentioned e.g. by Romeo Dallaire 
(Dallaire 2004), the Rwandan army today consists of the highly trained and 
disciplined RPF fighters.  
Eriksen (2005) states that the Rwandan government even developed a specialized 
taxation system for the occupied Congo regions, ensuring the flow of capital into 
the state treasury, making the Congo War a profitable rather than an expensive 
business for the country.  
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Moreover, the state is collecting a special war tax – in this case for the Congo War 
– from its inhabitants. It is not really clear if this really can be connected to the 
war per se though, since this trend can be found prior to the beginning of the war.  
 
For Rwanda the Congo War has become one of its main sources of income, 
creating an incentive for the Rwandan state to keep its control over the eastern 
regions of the Congo. When in 2002 the Rwandan forces, along with the Ugandan 
and other still remaining foreign military forces, were pulled out of the Congo, 
after the signing of the peace accords in Pretoria, it has yet to be seen if Rwanda 
really has given up its influence and access to the natural resources in this region, 
especially since the RCD-Goma, Rwanda’s ally in the region is still in control of 
the areas that were controlled by Rwanda before. The events that take place in the 
Great Lakes Region today, however, make it seem unlikely. 
The absence of neo-patrimonial features as discussed above has to be understood 
only for issues related to the military though, as the rest of Rwanda shows strong 
patrimonial features, especially since – once again – power, profits, as well as 
benefits are in most cases reserved for a small group, a Tutsi elite, where the inner 
core of this elite is – once again – connected through their past in the Ugandan 
refugee camps.  
This again leaves the majority of the population excluded from certain benefits 
that might arise –on grounds of ethnicity again.  
Still, Rwanda can be considered a unique example, since it combines different 
features, like strong military forces, a strict and centralized control over these 
forces combined with patrimonial governmental practices. Centralized power 
coexisting with patrimonial structures makes the state nonetheless less patrimonial, 
but awards it a special feature:  
“…the logic of regime survival has not undermined central control.” (Eriksen 2005:9). 
If one combines all the attributes of the Rwandan regime, the strength of the 
Rwandan state cannot be attributed to the effects of the Congo War, or be 
considered a direct result of warfare however. Therefore Eriksen states, that:  
 
“A puzzling fact about Rwanda, however is that this strength, in terms of 
military power and central political control, co-exists with widespread 
patrimonialism. Given the virtual consensus about the detrimental effects 
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of patrimonialism on state capacity, the existence of an apparently strong 
patrimonial state is something of an anomaly. However, the fact that 
power, and thereby control over resources used for patrimonial purposes, 
has been centrally controlled in Rwanda, may have limited the damage of 
patrimonialism for the state capacity. Centralised (sic!) corruption if (sic!) 
the kind seen in Rwanda is likely to be less detrimental for the state 
power than decentralized corruption.” (Eriksen, 2005:10).  
 
Eriksen includes in his conclusion the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1999), 
which state that centralized corruption is less damaging than decentralized 
corruption (Eriksen 2005:10). 
 
 
3. The Concept of Neo-patrimonialism 
 
There are two features to be considered when talking about states in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. Firstly, it has to be noted that modern African states are modelled after 
European paradigmas of statehood, meaning that African states are based on 
institutions such as parliaments, courts, bureaucracy, etc. Those institutions were 
introduced to the colonial countries either during colonialism or after gaining their 
independence. Either way it can be said that the main features of modern 
statehood do not originate in those countries but were imported by the respective 
colonial power, based on European understanding of statehood. Still, to this day 
they have constituted the foundations of modern statehood in Africa (Eriksen, 
2004).  
Secondly, it can be found that in many states in SSA certain features of state 
practice have become distinct. Analysts agree that state practices in many cases do 
not correspond to the principles of formal institutions and modern statehood, since 
African states tend to exhibit more and more features of what is often defined as 
patrimonialism or, to be more precise, what is considered a new form of it and 
referred to as neo-patrimonialism.  
“Patrimonialism” was originally used by Max Weber and describes a system 
where the lines between private and public interests become blurred, especially 
when public resources are misused for private usage (Eriksen, 2004). 
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Eriksen furthermore finds that:  
 
“For Weber, patrimonialism is one form of traditional domination, 
together with feudalism and patriarchy. (…) What distinguishes 
patrimonialism as a form of traditional domination from patriarchy and 
feudalism is first, that power is exercised beyond the domestic group of 
the family, clan or village, and second, that power is relatively 
centralized.” (Eriksen, 2004:33). 
 
Neo-patrimonialism therefore refers to the ideal of traditional leadership as 
defined in Max Weber’s “Herrschaftssoziologie” (Wimmer 2000). 
The democratic transition after the end of colonial rule seems to have worked for 
very few countries in Sub-Saharan-Africa only. Most of the countries today 
occupy a hybrid version of rational and legal governments that are tangled by neo-
patrimonial regime structures. In many countries decisions are based on personal 
relations and private interests rather than on institutionalized laws and regulations. 
Elections additionally often serve the sole purpose to make the world believe a 
regime has legitimate power and follows the globalized idea of “good 
governance”, in order to preserve its entitlement to developmental aid payments. 
This frequently entails the existence of bloated ministries and cabinets in most 
African countries (Wimmer 2000, Erdmann 2001). 
Erdmann (2001) furthermore states that these structures can be called neo-
patrimonial, defining this concept by contrasting it with Max Weber’s (1921) 
concept of patrimonialism. Patrimonialism constitutes the personal rule of a 
despot over military and administrative resources, making neo-patrimonialism a 
new, hybrid version of this concept. Erdmann states that within neo-
patrimonialism one can find not only patrimonial elements, but also a rational-
bureaucratic authority. Nevertheless, opposed to the patrimonial system, the neo-
patrimonial system recognizes the division between Public and Private Domains, 
at least in a formal sense. In neo-patrimonial systems it might often appear as if 
there were two systems subsisting in parallel worlds. However, this perception is 
decisive since these two systems do not only fail to coexist, but the patrimonial 
structures infiltrate into the legal-rational of the bureaucratic spheres and continue 
to deform its ability to function. Moreover, neo-patrimonialism entails a different 
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form of clientelism than patrimonialism. While patrimonialism entails the direct 
exchange between the patron and the client, neo-patrimonialism is more about the 
transfer of services and resources. Another difference between these two concepts 
is the origin of the services and resources that are to be transferred (Erdmann 
2001). Weber’s concept describes a form of traditional domination, mixed with 
feudalism and patriarchy (Eriksen 2006:10), Unlike in patrimonialism, where 
there are private services and resources of the patron transferred on a reciprocal 
basis to the client, neo-patrimonialism transfers public resources and services. 
Like in patrimonialism this specification of clientelism can be connected with 
kinship, but it can also exist without these ties. It may entail traditional social 
relations, but should by all means be considered a modern phenomenon (Erdmann 
2001). 
 
Eriksen adds to this that:  
“The problem is rather that such an approach tends to undercommunicate 
the distinctively modern aspects of African states. It is a fact that all 
modern states, in Africa and elsewhere, present themselves as 
representing the community as a whole, claim to follow formal 
procedures, accept the principle of the rule of law, acknowledge citizens’ 
rights, presents itself as promoting development etc. These are 
specifically modern features. While it is true that such formal institutions 
operate in different ways in Africa than in Europe, it cannot simply be 
assumed that the “real” character of African states are found in the 
“informal” or “traditional”, and that the formal and modern aspects of the 
state are of no importance. Moreover, the “traditional” or patrimonial 
features of the African state are themselves shaped by the arrival of 
modern institutions. It has been conclusively shown that what goes by 
the name of “tradition” is continually changing. One relevant example of 
this is how the institution of chiefdom changes character with the arrival 
of colonialism and the system of indirect rule. The colonial state codified 
“tradition”, and made it the basis of their rule. This codification was 
based on a selective interpretation of “tradition”. But whether tradition 
was correctly interpreted or not (and often, it was not), its codification by 
the state changed it into something new. By using its selective 
interpretation of tradition as the basis of state policies, tradition becomes 
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objectified. Furthermore, when the chiefs were incorporated into the 
state, the basis of their power changed. Through their access to state 
resources, they obtained a new kind of power base. This does not mean 
that their traditional legitimacy disappeared. On the contrary, it was a 
precondition for the chiefs’ access to the state in the first place. However, 
the character of the chiefs’ power changed, and was no longer 
exclusively based on “tradition”. Thus, in order to understand these 
aspects of the African state, it is necessary to take more seriously the fact 
that the contemporary African state is a hybrid, with distinctly modern as 
well as patrimonial features.” (States in Africa, Eriksen 2004:34) 
 
In the case of Rwanda, these neo-patrimonial features, especially the feature of 
political clientelism, were to be found between the Hutu, to specify the Hutu from 
the northern region, even more so between the entourage of the family of the 
president’s wife, consisting of a group of hardliners that are called “Akazu”, 
meaning “little house”. 
Wimmer finds that the three main features of neo-patrimonialism are personal rule, 
political clientelism and endemic corruption (Wimmer 2000). 
 
 
3.1.  Personal Rule 
 
The leadership in the sense of personal rule entails highly personalized and 
autocratic features. Furthermore, the acting regime in most cases lacks charismatic 
personality features, culminating in an unhealthy form of personality cult, for 
example Mobutu in Zaire. 
Personal rule undermines the core of governmental institutions, and degenerates 
them until only a relic of what they are supposed to be is left, while the country is 
controlled on an informal level, relying on personal relations. Personal rule leaves 
all the power with the governing person, leaving the future of the country to the 
will of an - in many cases omnipotent - despot. As already mentioned before, in 
more than one case this resulted in the destruction of a whole country on account 
of one person. The most famous examples are Liberia’s Samuel Doe, Jean-Bédel 
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Bokassa for the CAR and both Milton Obote and  Idi Amin in Uganda (Wimmer, 
2000:126). 
 
 
3.2. Political Clientelism 
 
This comprises the personal criteria the despot of a country uses in order to assign 
the ministerial and other high, governmentally related, positions. The structures 
work from top to bottom, each minister assigning the positions under his power on 
personal accounts. In most cases these are based on family, origin, and ethnicity, 
or through other networks such as the military. Qualification and achievements 
form no relevant objectives for recruitment reasons. This also accounts for the fact 
that nearly all Sub-Saharan countries have a bloated state apparatus, which forms 
a breeding ground for corruption, opportunism and patronage, leaving serious 
governmental issues untackled, or decided purely on the personal perception of 
the person responsible (Wimmer 2000:131). 
 
 
3.3. Endemic Corruption 
 
This facet of neo-patrimonialism describes the economic self-destruction of a state 
through the rampant greed of a marginal governing elite. The vast form of state-
run corruption and robbery that can be found in many African countries is 
accurately addressed as kleptocracy. This becomes even more visible in countries 
that own vast natural resources, e.g. Nigeria, Angola, Sierre Leone, the DRC – all 
of those countries have seen bloody conflicts in the previous years. Their mineral 
abundance has always been the - or at least one of the main factors - for endemic 
corruption and violence. 
There is a little story that is often told when it comes to the issue of corruption in 
Africa. This story was also once told to me by the head of the anti-corruption 
department of the UNODC when he tried to illustrate the problem of kleptocracy 
for the development of African countries: 
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“An Asian and an African become friends while they are both attending 
graduate school in the West. Years later, they each rise to become 
finance minister of their respective countries. One day, the African 
ventures to Asia to visit his old friend, and is startled by the Asian’s 
palatial home, the three Mercedes-Benz in the circular drive, the 
swimming pool, the servants.  ‘My god!’ the African exclaims. ‘We were 
just poor students before! How on earth can you afford all this?’ And the 
Asian takes his African friend to the window and points to a sparkling 
new elevated highway in the distance. ‘You see that toll road?’ says the 
Asian, and then proudly taps himself on the chest. ‘Ten percent.’ And the 
African nods approvingly. 
A few years later, the Asian ventures to Africa, to return the visit to his 
old friend. He finds the African living an a massive estate sprawling over 
several acres. There’s a fleet of dozens of Mercedes-Benz in the 
driveway, an indoor pool, a tennis court, an army of uniformed 
chauffeurs and servants. ‘My God!’ says the Asian. ‘How on earth can 
you afford all this?’ This time the African takes his Asian friend to the 
window and points. ‘You see the highway?’ he asks. But the Asian looks 
and sees nothing, just an open field with a few cows grazing. ‘I don’t see 
any highway,’ he says, straining his eyes. At this, the African smiles, 
taps himself on the chest, and boasts, ‘One hundred percent!’” 
(Richburg, 1998:174f). 
 
This story sums up the problem of African corruption, since there is a huge 
difference between still productive corruption, as it can be found in many 
countries of the world, and malignant corruption, as it especially occurs in Sub-
Sahara Africa. The corruption in many African states does not only drain the state 
and its institutions, but even undermines its very existence. 
Corruption has directed the incomes from the natural resources and developmental 
aid into the pockets of a few. The most famous example would be Zaire´s Mobutu: 
 
“’Estimates by Western diplomats of the private fortune Mubutu [Sese 
Seko] has hijacked from the central bank fluctuate between $4 billion 
and $11 billion: ‘At any rate,’ an American envoy to the country told me, 
‘he could clear the national debt by writing a personal check.’’.” 
(Langford, 1999:63). 
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Poltical leaders such as Angola´s Dos Santos, Kongo´s (Brazzaville) Sassou 
Nguesso or Gabun´s Omar Bongo have embezzled sums in the dimension of 
corporate companies. Many of them have invested in natural ressources, real 
estate, etc. within and outside their country, often making them successful 
entrepreneurs. Still, their fortunes come out of the public accounts of their 
countries (Nanga).  
 
These extreme forms of corruption cannot only be charged to local politicians, but 
also to many of the companies doing business with them. 
 
A very vivid example for the problem of neopatrimonialism with all its features of 
clientelism, personal rule and corruption was shown during the elections in April 
2007 in Nigeria. More than 200 people died in uprisings of politically motivated 
violence during that period. An article of Human Rights Watch finds that: 
 
 “Das Benehmen vieler Regierungsstellen sei  ‘derart von Gewalt und 
Korruption durchdrungen, dass es mehr nach krimineller Aktivität als 
nach demokratischer Regierungsführung aussieht’.”(Dumbs, 2007).   
 
Chabal and Daloz put it in an even more radical way: “…the State in sub-Saharan 
Africa is nothing but a relatively empty shell.” (Daloz, Chabal 1999). 
This problem is furthermore fuelled by the neopatrimonial feature of 
personal rule that can to be found in Nigerian politics. Most of the small 
political actors in the provinces who hope to make it to the big scene are 
backed by local powerplayers, who not only provide financial ressources for 
election campaigns, but also use their hitmen to hector possible political 
opponents. For this help the repayment does not only include high sums 
from public accounts, but also the allocation of public positions to the 
benefitor’s entourage. Human Right Watch (HRW) moreover state in an 
article about the elections 2007 in Nigeria:  
 
“’An Stelle eines demokratischen Wettbewerbs wurde der Kampf um 
Ämter oft auf den Straßen ausgetragen, von Schägertrupps, die von 
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Politikern rekrutiert wurden.‘ Hoffnungen, dass mit dem neuen 
Präsidenten Umaru Yar’Adua die Lage besser wird sind gering: Er war 
früher Gouverneur von Katsina. Die dortige Regierung hat das 
Programm gegen die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit laut dem HRW-Bericht auf 
ihre Weise interpretiert: Mit dem Geld sollen jugendliche Schläger 
bezahlt worden sein.“ (Dumbs, 2007).  
 
Examples like these are manifold in SSA´s everyday politics, making endemic 
corruption one of the main features of state failure. 
 
 
3.3.1. Insertion: Is Developmental Aid aiding Neo-Patrimonial 
Structures? 
 
The question about the development of most of the countries in Sub-Sahara Africa 
that is not only missing, but in most cases even declining has created a lot of 
theories in the last decades. But none of these theories, like the dependencia and 
modernization theories and all the others, and also none of the newer appendages 
that are to be found in the developmental discourse are able to give a really 
satisfactory answer to those problems either and worse, none of them seems to be 
able to counteract the spiral of declining development. The trend of appendages 
like “neo-colonialism” to blame the catastrophic state of development on the 
capitalistic features of the world economy, miss out on including the factors and 
developments of the political conditions in these countries (Wimmer 2000).  
 
Massive criticism, especially from African economists such as James Shikwati or 
Axelle Kabou, against western developmental aid has risen in the past few years. 
There are an estimated 40.000 westerners working in the aid business in SSA 
today. The business with aid is booming, criticism as it is expressed by Shikwati 
or Kabou hardly never welcome. 
James Shikwati, for example, calls for a complete stop of developmental aid 
payments.  
So far, about half a billion US-Dollars were given to African countries during the 
last 45 years, a total of four Marshall-plans. Still, there has been no recognizable 
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improvement in the Sub-Saharan countries. Much worse – even the percentage of 
African goods in the world trade – except for oil exports – is declining, while 
national debts and poverty are growing continuously. The usual answer to this 
problem is to donate even more developmental aid to those countries. At the last 
G8 summit, donor countries were promising more money – yet again. 
For critics like Shikwati this is one of the roots of all problems.  
He and like-minded people acknowledge the damage that was inflicted by 
colonialism and find that the answer is not foreign money flooding the country. 
Shikwati, for example, even goes further, stating that the structures of corrupt 
states are kept afloat with these development payments. The problem is, according 
to Shikwati that the power elites do not have to build democratic institutions or 
infrastructure, since with or without those things there is money coming into the 
country anyway.  
 
Critics of development theories find that development aid much more abets 
corruption, armament and ecocide in the recipient countries. They even go as far 
as to say that these payments fuel neo-patrimonial structures and preserve them 
instead of changing them. 
It is a misconception that just because the donors demand the creation of 
democratic features in a state that those can be created by simply pumping money 
into a country, especially when the country does not have the institutions to use 
the money expediently (Die Zeit 2006). 
It is hard to tell if the end of development payments would trigger a restoration 
and/or creation of democratic features in SSA countries, but it seems – if one 
considers the lack of results of developmental aid – that this should at least be 
considered a serious topic for discussion. It also has to be noted that this 
discussion does not include humanitarian relief aid.  
It has to be acknowledged that the issue of humanitarian aid also raises a lot of 
criticism in the developmental and humanitarian aid discourse. These issues shall 
not be addressed in this paper though. 
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4. Violence and Conflict in Relation to State Failure 
 
Violent conflicts in Africa are one of the major factors for state failure and state 
erosion. The other way round, the failure of states has also led to internal as well 
as regional conflicts.  
During the period of de-colonialzation from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s 
the number of violent conflicts in SSA increased strongly and finally exploded 
during the 1980s and reached its peak in the year 1991. Since then the number of 
armed conflicts has halved. Nearly all of the African wars and conflicts have been 
fought on counts of societal issues, such as ethnic, communal or revolutionary 
reasons. Today we find an estimated 15 million “forcibly displaced persons” 
worldwide, mainly “internally displaced people” (IDPs). Only an estimated 3.5 
million of these 15 million displaced persons are thought to be transnational 
refugees (ACPCC, 2005).  
A state’s collapse is rarely a sudden event but has to be considered – as discussed 
earlier –  a long-lasting process. This process is then accompanied by state erosion, 
mainly in countries that have never shown strong features of statehood in the first 
place.  
One of the most important aspects of state failure is the detoriation of the security 
sector; this applies to internal as well as external security. In addition to a lack of 
security the states find themselves unable to provide necessary infrastructure, 
which as a result usually leads to the state’s collapse.  
These breakdowns are then accompanied or/and followed by a struggle for power 
and resources between different groups and alliances, who – again – in many of 
the cases define themselves along the lines of ethnicity. These conflicts and power 
struggles are not necessarily resolved by one group overpowering the other. 
Violence can take different forms, each with its own unique set of causes and 
circumstances. Those forms and their effects and impacts are to be discussed more 
thoroughly in the following part of the paper 
. 
The number of conflicts has dramatically increased during the last decade, and in 
2000 about half of the African countries were affected, either directly or indirectly, 
by violent conflicts, costing as many lives as epidemics and natural desasters. But 
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not only direct forms of violence cost lives, also the events that follow and 
accompany those conflicts (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).  
 
After the end of the Cold Car when the proxy regimes that had been supported by 
either western or communist countries became obsolete, many of the autocratic 
potentates lost their power. When the external support was stopped most of the 
already ramshackle regimes collapsed and many of those states became centres of 
regional insecurity (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).  
 
“By 2000, over half of the countries in Africa and 20% of the population 
were affected by conflict. There were eleven major conflicts with more 
than a thousand war related deaths a year. The extent of conflict was 
greater than in any other region in the world.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:8).  
 
 
4.1. The Different Forms of Conflicts in Africa 
 
There are different kinds of warfare to be identified in Africa. Moreover, the 
character of conflict has been changing within the last decades. The war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea is considered the only conventionally fought war in the last 
decade in SSA, conventionally fought meaning that targets were mainly strategic 
and military points.  
This kind of conventional warfare is based on high technology weapons and 
strategies and therefore extremely expensive. Most of the wars and conflicts in 
Africa have a factional character, the enemy lines are often fluid. They are mainly 
fought with small arms and light weapons and are therefore easier to finance.  
Small arms and light weapons means by definition all arms that can be operated 
by only one or two people.  
These kind of conflicts tend to be rather opportunistic than strategic and in most 
cases evolve rapidly from the original cause to other, mainly economic and 
political reasons such as the exploitation of (natural) resources (“The causes of 
conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:12ff).  
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Many of the conflicts in the last decade in Africa have shown features of genocide 
and ethnic violence, in most cases they were preceded and/or accompanied by a 
serious amount of propaganda.  
Especially the media in Rwanda were a tool known for ethnically motivated 
propaganda. Ethnic conflicts additionally tend to spread rapidly, almost always 
leaving behind a massive death toll.  
 
Another feature of SSA conflicts is the use of mainly low tech weapons, such as 
knives and machetes, as they were used in Rwanda.  
Such conflicts can be found in the Sudan today and also periods of genocidal 
attacks occur regularly in the DRC, mainly in the Kivu region, just to name a few.  
The issue of ethnicity is nothing new to SSA countries; it was already introduced 
during colonialim. The division between ruling and non-ruling ethnicities by 
colonial powers has created deep crater within societies and can be found in 
countries like the DRC, Rwanda or Burundi. These artificially created differences 
are in many cases burned deep into societies and are still used as a reason for 
maintaining power on counts of ethnicity. When prejudice and hatred are firmly 
entrenched in history they are nearly impossible to overcome.  
 
Ethnicity is still abused by governments and local leasers today, for example in 
the DRC. There ethnic conflicts were even openly provoked in the Kivu region  
 
“…with the intention of destabilising areas under Rwandan influence. 
Equally, elements of the Ugandan armed forces exploited ethnic 
differences in order to benefit commercially from the conflict. In both 
instances community divisions have been deepened and there have been 
greater numbers of fatalaties and injuries than experienced in more 
conventional fighting.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 
2001:15). 
 
All the features of warfare mentioned above have coalesced in the recent years, 
melting into a “new” form of warfare in Africa. In these conflicts not only state 
forces engage, but also factional forces that are then often supported by state 
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forces or even substitute them. These factional forces are, in many cases, self-
sustaining through pillaging of natural resources.  
Ethnicity as a cause of conflict becomes more and more common and is in many 
cases used to gain support for the violence that is led by the participators. (“The 
causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001). 
 
 
(Table #1: “The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001) 
 
 
4.1.1. Genocide and Political Mass Murder (Politicide) 
 
Since the 1990s violence in Africa has reached terrible heights, often connected to 
ethnic violence and genocide. Such heights were e.g. the Rwandan genocide in 
1994, but also the genocidal massacres in Burundi, or also in Sudan today.  
These conflicts follow the abuse and exploitation of ethnic discrimination in 
Africa that dates back to colonialism.  
Violence has been used to sustain conflicts and/or to legitimate that the power is 
held by a certain ethnic group. Still, ethnical differences as such conflicts are not 
the primary cause of conflict (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 
2001). 
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4.1.2. Genocide 
 
When talking about the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994, one has to take 
a closer look at the features that make this conflict a genocide.  
 
“Der Genozid ist ein vorsätzliches Verbrechen, systematisch organisiert 
und ins Werk gesetzt zur Ausrottung bestimmter, nach Kriterien der 
Nationalität, der Rasse oder der Religion ausgewählter 
Zivilgesellschaften.“  
(Kapuscinski, 16.03.2001) 
 
Genocide was first defined by Rapahael Lemkin during the Second World War in 
his book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” and in 1946 was also in the UN 
General Assembly discussed for the first time. Two years later the UN Genocide 
Convention was passed, but it took until 1951 to come into force 
(Chalk/Jonassohn, 1990:8). 
Genocide, as it is defined in Article II of the UN Genocide Convention:  
“Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  
(UN Genocide Convention) 
One of the main loopholes of the UN Genocide Convention is the fact that 
political groups that become victims of genocide and are killed or prosecuted 
because of their polticial affiliations are not included. This deficiency goes back to 
the veto of the UdSSR against the first draft of the Convention, which still 
included political groups. The UdSSR furthermore vetoed any reference to the 
issue of political mass murder.  
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Other objects of criticism are the phrases “mental harm” and the “intent to 
destroy” as well as the absence of inter-state actors as perpetrators (see Serb 
nationalists in Bosnia, militias in Sudan or the DRC, etc.).  
The problem with “mental harm” is the fact that only when the physical life of a 
group is endangered does it falls into the definition of genocide.  
Whereas the problem with the phrase “intent to destroy” is obvious, since the 
governments involved in genocide or acts of genocide never really make their 
plans public in advance.  
In regard to this, the Hutu regime in Rwanda is a rare exception since in the 
Rwandan media these intentions of genocidal acts were quite explicitly made 
public (Harff, 2003).  
It also has to be noted that in the case of Rwanda in Resolution 955 (1994), which 
builds the foundation for the ICTR, political affiliation is included on account of 
Crimes against Humanity under Article 3: 
“Crimes against humanity 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute  
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a  
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on 
national,  
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
(a)Murder; 
(b)Extermination; 
(c )Enslavement; 
(d)Deportation; 
(e)Imprisonment ; 
(f)Torture; 
(g)Rape; 
(h)Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i)Other inhumane acts.” (S/RES/955 (1994) 
The question of how an atrocity such as genocide is possible has been asked many 
times in the last decades, espescially since the Holocaust.  
Chalk and Jonassohn discuss the question how such cruel and inhumane acts are 
even possible and they find that: 
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 “… it is not possible, at least not as long as the potential victims are 
perceived as people. We have no evidence that a genocide was ever 
performed on a group of equals. The victims must not only not be equals, 
but also clearly defined as something less than human.”  
(Chalk/Jonassohn, 1990:28). 
 
Before and during the Rwandan genocide the media played a major role 
in the de-humanization of the entire Tutsi-population and additionally 
also the people that were (thought to be) opposed to the ruling regime. 
The techniques used by the media shall be described and analyzed in 
chapter 5.3. 
 
(Tab.#2: Harff, 2003:60) 
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4.2. The Impact of Conflict in Africa 
 
The impact of these violent conflicts influences the SSA civil population on more 
than one level, since these conflicts do not only leave people dead and uprooted, 
but whole societies as well as economies distressed.  
 
Over eight million people were killed – directly or indirectly – as a consequence 
of warfare in Africa. While in Africa in general, one out of 20 deaths is clearly 
related to war; in Sub-Sahara Africa one in six males is killed through warfare. 
Moreover, ten of the countries most affected by conflict worldwide are in Africa, 
with five of them being considered full-scale wars.  
Especially the increasing level of targeting civilians has taken new, tragic heights, 
leaving millions not only dead but also displaced, abused and mutilated. The 
intensified attacks especially against women and children instead of armed groups 
are the most tragic development in African warfare, whereas in the rest of the 
world civilian casualties are declining.  
 
Moreover, African conflicts tend to become more and more brutal, since 
mutilation, torture as well as the use of family members and children in killings 
and rape  are increasingly becoming more common and are even used strategically.  
The RUF in Sierra Leone and other militia groups, but also state forces tend to use 
intensified violence, not only to fuel fear within the population, but also as a form 
of binding ritual, making it even harder to reintegrate former militias or child 
soldiers back into society. Additionally, extreme violence is also used to 
intimidate the population and secure votes, but also on account of humiliation and 
revenge in an ethnic context especially (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara 
Africa”, 2001).  
 
“… extreme violence of this kind will erode the social fabric of African 
societies and further hasten state collapse.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001)  
 
The issue of child soldiers as mentioned above is also becoming a serious problem 
in African conflicts, since they can be used as a specific and especially brutal tool 
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of warfare. Child soldiers are exceedingly used by warlords. The most famous 
example for such practices is the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern 
Uganda, but also the Interahamwe militias in Rwanda included many children and 
young men. There are an estimated 100.000-200.000 child soldiers in Africa today 
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant against the leader of the 
LRA, Joseph Kony. The ICC just opened its first case against the Congolese 
warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who is also accused of having abused children as 
soldiers.   
 
Next to the human tragedy that results from these conflicts, there is also an 
economic aspect to it, as a consequence also resulting in tragedies such as 
displacement and epidemics.  
Armed conflict is to be considered as one of the main reasons for the decline and 
erosion of African statehood. “Continuous economic decline plays a major part in state 
collapse and conflict.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:14).  
 
The most obvious impact is the denial and loss of land through warfare. This can 
be related to either direct warfare, but also to the use of land-mines, making 
important agricultural areas unavailable and creating even more flows of IDP´s 
and Refugees.  
 
“Africa has the highest level of internal displacement in the world and 
some of the largest refugee flows, the majority from countries in conflict. 
In 2000 almost eleven million people in Africa were internally displaced. 
This is an increase of two million over the past year and is the second 
consecutive increase in two years, after five years in which the numbers 
remained relatively stable. (…) Internally displaced people now 
outnumber refugees by  a ratio of three to one. Taking refugees and 
internally displaced people together, 14 million people in Africa are 
uprooted.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:9) 
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(Tab. #3: UNHCR, 2006) 
 
 
(Tab. #4: UNHCR, 2005) 
 
Violent conflicts have led to production losses of sometimes up to 45% e.g. in 
Angola, making it necessary for African states to import food and food aid in 
many cases.  
Other reasons for violence are also provided by the exploitation of natural 
resources, the control of land and also water rights.  
Water is a resource that is becoming more and more valuable all over the world 
and is therefore considered to become one of the main factors of conflict in the 
future.  
Also the exploitation of resources, especially resources like diamonds, oil, cobalt, 
etc. make conflicts for many factions self-paying or even an enrichening business. 
Therefore the armed forces are frequently not interested in ending a conflict and 
mediation then becomes (nearly) impossible. Also:  
 
“When either party to a conflict feels that it has a percieved advantage or 
disadvantage, it continues to fight, spurred on the prospect of victory or 
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the desire to negotiate from a more advantegous position. A “hurting 
stalemate” where all the belligerents have lost, provides opportunity for 
resolution of conflict. In many cases, the opportunities for resolution are 
lost because of the lack of credible external guarantors to the peace 
process.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001) 
 
On the economic level, countries distressed by violent conflict become 
unattractive for outside investors, whereas on the other hand they attract organized 
crime. It is therefore common to these countries that armed and organized crime 
sky-rockets.  
 
“This is followed by a downwards spiral in both domestic savings and 
inward investment. The economy becomes dependent on the exploitation 
of easily extractable natural ressources. Government revenue suffers and 
the state becomes criminalised. Commercial and state interests can 
become combined in sustaining conflict, as dual eceonomies develop in 
which military business partnerships jointly trade, exploit resources and 
pay for conflict.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:12) 
 
Africa loses an estimated 2% of its annual economic growth on this account (“The 
causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:11).  
Additionally war also leads to a destruction of the state’s infastructure, since 
either maintenace or investment become impossible, leaving schools, 
telecommunication systems, hospitals, roads, electricity, water supply, etc. in 
ruins.  
In many cases, if roads are not destroyed they become unpassable due to 
roadblock controls by militias, making it also nearly impossible for human relief 
agencies to reach their destination. Moreover, a country without a functioning 
infrastructure is not attractive to any international investors and businesses. 
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“Over the past twenty years Africa has lost over fifty per cent of its 
transport infrastructure, many of the losses due to conflict. This loss has 
both an immediate and a long-term impact on African economies.”  
(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:11). 
 
On top of causing serious harm to the country’s economy, it also affects the 
economies of the region, especially refugee flows have a heavy impact on a 
region’s economy and also lead to a loss of trade between the countries.  
IDP’s mostly squat in and around cities. Their loss of access to their own means 
of production connotes another serious impact on a country’s structural service 
such as housing, but also on the provision of resources like water and food. 
During the past years social infrastructure has also become increasingly targeted 
by militias, espescially health centres and schools. In Mozambique, for example, 
the 15 year war has destroyed over 40% of these institutions. This results in a high 
number of uneducated young men, who in combination with sky-rocketing 
unemployment rates pose a huge recruitment pool for militias. The militias in 
most cases consist “…of marginalized or socially excluded young men” (“The causes 
of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:15) who have no hope for a better future.  
 
In Rwanda the Hutu-militia, the so called Interahamwe, mainly consisted of such 
young men, espescially from the rural areas. Societies with extraordinarily high 
numbers of uneducated and unemployed young men are more likely to experience 
violent outbreaks (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).  
Such an outbreak, for example, followed the explosion of food prices in Haiti in 
2008 and is in another form to be found in the violent outbreaks in the South 
African slums, which were directed against foreigners due to the hopeless job-
situation for young people. 
 
The economic shock that follows state failure and state erosion can also often be 
one of the activators of violence and warfare. Economic break-downs can also be 
related to natural catastrophes as well as a “… sudden large shift in terms of trade and 
comodity prices.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:14).  
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These economic collapses then are often followed by famine and/or mass 
displacement, as for example the famine in Ethiopia in 1974, which resulted in the 
overthrow of the Ethiopian regime and was followed by years of conflict. (“The 
causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).  
The plummeting prices of coffee on the world market and the collapse of the 
coffee agreement are considered to be among the main factors of the violent 
outbreaks in Rwanda.  
 
On an international level, the violent conflicts in Africa also have a serious impact, 
since organized crime benefits from these developments. Illicit traffic in small 
arms and light weapons, money laundering and drug trafficking are serious issues 
that also concern the rest of the world. Especially the ready availability of small 
arms and light weapons is thought to be one of the main roots of the extreme 
cruelty of African conflicts.  
 
Evidently after the end of the Cold War arms traders from the former Soviet 
Union discovered Africa as one of the main purchasers of arms and ammunition. 
Many African countries now own enormous arms caches, in most cases from 
previous wars, and those weapons are circulating in conflict regions.  
“Throughout Africa the usual market price for the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle remains 
steady at US $25.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:15).  
Throughout the last decade a network of national and international dealers has 
emerged, trading arms for minerals. This is leading to an incontrollable 
exploitation of natural resources and a massive flow of weapons and ammunition 
into the conflict zones, often making conflicts self-sustaining. 
 
On an international level these illegal tradings of weapons and natural resources 
along with an increasing flow of asylum seekers and migrants have to be tackled 
by the international community.  
On the other hand pre- and interventional military missions have become 
exceedingly unpopular within the international community; especially for the UN, 
the failure of many of their peace-keeping missions to Africa has scraped the 
credibility and power of the organization.  
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One of the several failed missions was the UN mission UNAMIR I that was 
established in 1993 in order to monitor the peace process between the Rwandan 
state and the RPF rebels. The Rwandan UN mission furthermore failed to 
intervene during the 1994 genocide, rendering the UNAMIR personnel bystanders 
to the raging genocide.  
 
 
 
(Tab. # 5) 
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5. Rwanda 
5.1. The Rwandan Genocide 
 
“The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech.” 
(Schabas, 2000:14) 
 
 
5.1.1. An overview of the Rwandan history 
 
In 1894 Rwanda was annexed for the first time by Europe, to be exact by 
Germany. The region was assigned to Germany during the Berlin Conference and 
the new colonial rulers decided to keep the political system they found in Rwanda 
and to govern the country through the system of “indirect rule”. Rwanda had – by 
European standards – a highly developed political system with feudal structures. 
Moreover, the European colonial rulers believed that the ruling group of the Tutsi 
people was more highly developed since in their opinion, the Tutsi descended 
from the Europeans, whereas Bantu descent was ascribed to the working classes, 
who mainly consisted of the Hutu people. 
Up to now anthropologists have neither concurred in how the political system in 
Rwanda was constructed nor on the issue of how deep the impact of differences of 
the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa actually was.  
The most common view on what the system in Rwanda looked like before 1894 is 
comparing it to a form of caste system. In this system the Tutsi people represented 
the aristocracy and therefore “ruling caste”, whereas the Hutu people represented 
the working class mainly consisting of farmers. Trade and Warfare were ascribed 
to the Tutsi.  
Still, it was possible for Hutu people to ascend to the “ruling-caste” by 
accumulating cattle and property as well as through marriage. These rises to the 
“ruling class” are not considered to have been very common, though.  
 
Another unique thing about Rwanda is the fact that unlike in other African 
countries where the colonial rulers encountered many different tribes and even 
more different cultures and languages. Sharing one history the Rwandan people 
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thought of each other as Rwandans with one common history, territory, language 
(Kinyarwanda) and culture (Pottier, 1995:53).  
Nevertheless, it can be established as a fact, that the differentiation between Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa had already existed before the European powers arrived.  
After the end of the First World War Belgium took over the power from the 
Germans and began to change the political system from “indirect rule” to “direct 
rule”. As early as 1933 the Belgians began to establish principles that divided the 
Rwandan population into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa on counts of physical 
characteristics. Already existing differences were not only strengthened but also 
put in printing through the creation of identification cards. During the brutal rule 
of the Belgian colonial power thousands of Hutus fled into neighboring Uganda 
(Pottier, 1995). 
The population in the north of Rwanda was the part that in the beginning was able 
to fight against the German colonial rule the longest, but in the end was conquered 
with the help of the Tutsi military, who also during colonization made up the 
biggest part of the army. In the course of resistance a group of hardliners formed 
in the north, creating their own, extreme form of Hutu culture (the “Hutu-Power”). 
The main goal of their belief was to end the dominance of the Tutsi population.  
In 1957 the first political manifest was published on this account. In the wake of 
independence they were also the first to demand a government run by the majority, 
not the minority. Still, their idea of the governing Hutu majority mainly included 
the Hutu people from the north, and finally they managed to direct the political 
power into the hands of a small group of northern Hutu extremists (Melvern, 
2007:7).  
 
While the Hutus account for 85% of the Rwandan population, Tutsi are 14% and 
Twa only 1% (Banton, Igwara, Pottier 1995). 
Kressel describes the differences between these three groups as follows: 
 
“According to stereotype, the three groups have profoundly different 
physical appearances: The Tutsis are very slender, very tall, straight-
nosed and light brown in complexion; the Hutus have Bantu features 
including wooly hair, broad noses, and full lips. They are generally of 
medium height and somewhat stockier than the Tutsis. The Twa, related 
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to the pygmies, are very short, with pronounced cheekbones, bulging 
foreheads, and flat noses. At one time, these stereotypes corresponded 
closely to reality, and it is still easy to find prominent illustrations. (…) 
Still, intermarriage has greatly diminished the once large physical 
differences among groups.” (Kressel, 1996:94). 
 
In intermarriage families the classification of the father decided to what group the 
children were aligned. Intermarriage was much more common between – in most 
cases very successful – Hutu men with Tutsi women, than the other way round. 
Kressel states that: “The mother’s blood is irrelevant. During genocide, the government 
issued identity cards became, for many, the final arbiters of life and death.” (Kressel, 
1996:94). 
After the publication of the manifest mentioned above and even more so after 
independence from Belgium on July 1st, 1962 the fight for political power in 
Rwanda began. These struggles did not only take place between Hutus and Tutsis, 
but also between different Hutu groups. 
Episodes of massacres against Tutsi people can be found from that time on and 
become more common after independence in 1962. These episodes finally 
culminate in the tragic events of 1994, leaving hundreds of thousands dead. 
Although much of the violence in Rwanda after independence can be assigned to 
the struggle for political power, it also has to be noted that it was not the sole 
reason for violence.  
The causes of the bloody tide of events root deep in the history of the country and 
Rwandan society and have more than just one origin.  
 
 
5.1.2. Rwanda after Independence 
 
Like in many African countries after independence also in Rwanda political 
clientelism was to be found. As noted before, Rwanda did not consist of different 
languages, cultures or religions; therefore the attribution of features of political 
clientelism was based on different reasons. Rwanda was mainly catholic after 
colonialism. This has been changing in the last years, especially since the 
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genocide Islam has been growing rapidly and also natural religions have been on 
the increase again. 
 
The most important positions within the government were assigned within one 
group, who called themselves “Akazu” in Kinyarwanda. “Akazu” means “Little 
House”, which and in this case identifies the family of the wife of the then 
incumbent president, Habyarimana, and their entourage. They formed the hard 
core of the Hutu-extremists from the north. Through keeping all the power within 
the entourage of the “Akazu”, the Hutu hardliners were able to secure all the 
power and influence. 
The first attempts to divide the power between the Hutus of different regions were 
followed by genocidal episodes that were in most cases directed against the Tutsi. 
These violent outbreaks were always accompanied by waves of refugees who fled 
the neighboring countries, mainly Uganda. Finally the Hutus from central and 
southern Rwanda lost their power to the “Akazu” from the north. General Juvenal 
Habyarimana seized power and was able to hold on to it – with some short 
disruptions – until 1994. 
As already mentioned above, due to regular massacres huge numbers of Tutsi 
refugees fled into neighboring Uganda. The first big refugee wave already took 
place in 1959. From 1963 onwards Tutsi refugees started to invade Rwanda, 
trying to resize power over the country.  
Code name of the first invasion was “Inyenzi”, which means “Cockroaches”, 
because they were attacking silently in the dark of the night.  
The name “Inyenzi” later became one of the main propaganda synonyms for all 
Tutsi people (Mullen 1995). 
 
Rwanda, being a state without any commodities or other resources has always 
been solely dependent on the agricultural sector and was able to achieve huge 
economic growth after independence.  
From 1973 to 1980 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew an estimated 5.7% 
per annum and between 1980 and 1987 still an estimated 2.4%. With the collapse 
of the International Coffee Agreement and the following inflation of coffee prices 
the growth of the Rwandan economy started to decline slowly at first and soon 
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plunged down. The subsequent inflation finally led to the complete break-down of 
the Rwandan economy (Mullen, 1995). 
The collapse of the economy left the country with masses of unemployed, the  
state being unable to absorb these huge numbers. In 1990 the Rwandan state was 
only able to employ 7.000 people, leaving masses of mainly young men with no 
hope.  
Additionally, the unemployment rate was growing an estimated 80.000 each year. 
The fast growing erosion of the state’s economy and the exploding financial debt 
left the Rwandan state with no other option than to turn to the IMF for help. 
Rwanda was granted a credit in 1990 on the condition that it had to extend the 
state’s democratic features. Up to that point Rwanda had been a one-party ruled 
state without free elections.  
In order to make sure these transitions happened the way the IMF intended, teams 
of experts were sent into the country in order to monitor and advise on the 
political transition into a multi-party system. This included the abolishment of 
many of the discriminating regulations that persisted in Rwanda.  
During that time the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) still attacked Rwanda from 
neighboring Uganda. The attacks of the RPF were feared by the whole Rwandan 
population, Hutus and Tutsis alike.  
At the beginning of the 1990’s a violent conflict exploded between the Hutu and 
Tutsi in Burundi, sending waves of Hutu refugees into Rwanda and other 
neighboring countries (Mullen, 1995). These developments created even more 
tensions in Rwanda and posed an additional burden for the Rwandan economy. 
 
“In allen Fällen ist der Vernichtung und Ausrottung der verfolgten 
Gemeinschaft eine Phase des Leidens, des Hungers, der Erniedrigung 
bzw. des Terrors vorausgegnagen, um zu suggerieren, dass der Tod den 
Opfern als eine Geste der Barmherzigkeit – als eine Erlösung – 
erscheinen könnte.  
Schließlich wurden alle diese Völkermorde im gesellschaftlichen 
Kontext einer tiefen ökonomischen, politischen und moralischen Krise 
vorbereitet und begangen, zu einem Zeitpunkt, da das religiöse Gewissen 
ausgeschaltet, die Gefühlswelt verarmt und die Fähigkeit, Gutes vom 
Bösen zu unterscheiden, völlig verkümmert war. (Kapuscinski, 
16.03.2001) 
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In order to end the conflict between Rwanda and the RPF the Organization of the 
African Union (OAU) finally decided to intervene. The OAU intended to end the 
conflict between the two fighting parties and to also to (re-)integrate the RPF into 
Rwanda and in parts even into the Rwandan army. 
Due to the growing pressure through the OAU and the IMF, Rwanda’s leading 
party, the MRD, finally agreed to sign a cease fire agreement with the RPF, which 
then led to the “Arusha Peace Agreements”. During the process of peace 
negotiations that were held in Arusha, Tanzania, one of the main issues was the 
(re-)integration of refugees and also the RPF into the country.  
The issue of integrating the RPF soldiers into the Rwandan army was especially 
hard fought over, especially since, with exception of the Garde Présidentille, the 
rest of the Rwandan army (Forces Armées Rwandaises – FAR) was in a disastrous 
condition, poorly trained and paid and sometimes even starved, whereas the RPF 
was known to be well equipped and efficiently trained.  
The main reason that the RPF had not been able to seize power so far was that the 
French army had sent troops to back up the FAR. Therefore the thought of 
integrating the RPF into the FAR was frightening for the leading regime.  
In addition, due to the collapse of the coffee market, Rwanda was experiencing 
food shortages; especially in rural areas, the population was starving.  
For the hardliners within the MDR government party the contents of Arusha 
Accords were unacceptable and by signing the Arusha Accords president 
Habyariman became a liability for the Hutu regime. A strong polarization within 
the party followed, since the hardliner wing within the MDR was strictly against 
sharing power with anyone else and even more against the integration of the RPF 
into the Rwandan state and army. According to the Arusha Accords Rwanda had 
to transform itself into a multi-party system.  
In addition to the creation of the liberal parties, the hardliners within the MDR 
also founded their own party, the extremist CDR. The members of the more 
liberal parties were also targeted by the “génocidaires” during the genocide and a 
lot of the opposition leaders were killed in the beginning (Mullen 1995). The 
genocide of 1994 was also one last, cruel attempt of the Hutu-hardliners to create 
what they thought was a pure Hutu-nation.  
During the years prior to the genocide Rwanda had already become one of the 
main importers of weapons (Melvern, 2000).  
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The most important actor during the 1994 genocide was primarily the Hutu militia, 
the so called Interahamwe, which mainly consisted of young and unemployed 
men. When in 1994 the FAR was foremost engaged in fighting against the 
invading RPF, especially the Interahamwe was involved in the genocidal killings 
(Dallaire, 2003). 
 
The portrayal of the Rwandan genocide as a civil war by the international media, 
or even as tribal fighting, as it was described at the beginning, created a 
completely wrong picture of the conflict. There is a huge difference between a 
genocide and civil war, since a genocide is always a (state) planned event and 
never one that takes place coincidentally (Third Reich, Cambodia,…).  
 
 
5.1.3. The Burundian Genocide 
 
The brutal conflict in Burundi in 1993 was used effectively for anti-Tutsi 
propaganda, as was the Rwandan (colonial) history and the RPF attacks. All these 
events were used to create fear and insecurity amongst the Rwandan population. 
The demographics and history of Burundi were similar to Rwanda, with one huge 
difference: After independence the Tutsi minority was able to hold on to political 
power. The percentage of Hutu and Tutsi was similar to the demographics of 
Rwanda.  
Burundi had experienced outbreaks of violence in the past decades, all showing 
numerous features of genocide, even before the massacres in 1993 there had been 
episodes of killings, reaching their climax in the Burundian genocide in 1972 with 
an estimated 150.000 victims (Banton, 1995).  
 
In 1993 for the first time a Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected in 
Burundi, but was assassinated soon after. This led to a series of massacres of Hutu 
hardliners against Tutsi people,which resulted in massacres of Hutus, where also 
the mainly Burundian army – consisting mainly of Tutsi – was involved. 
Thousands of Hutus left Burundi, fleeing to Rwanda and Tanzania. For the 
Rwandan extremists the Burundian Hutu refugees offered a huge recruitment pool 
for the following genocide in Rwanda.  
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What Lisa Malkki finds in her study about the refugee camps in Tanzania also 
accounts for Burundian refugee camps in Rwanda and did not only influence the 
Hutus in the camps, but also the Rwandan Hutu population: 
 
“The most unusual and prominent social fact about the camp was that its 
inhabitants were continually engaged in an impassioned construction and 
reconstruction of their history ‘a people’. The narrative production of this 
history ranged from descriptions of the ‘autochthonous’ origins of 
Burundi as a ‘nation’ and of the primordial social harmony that prevailed 
among the originary inhabitants (the Twa and the Hutu), to the coming of 
pastoral Tutsi ‘foreigners from the north’ to the Tutsi theft of power from 
the ‘natives’ (Hutu and Twa) by ruse and trickery, and, finally, to the 
culminating mass killings of Hutu by Tutsi in 1972. These narratives, 
ubiquitous in the camp, formed an overarching historical trajectory that 
was fundamentally also a national story about the ‘rightful natives’ of 
Burundi. The camp refugees saw themselves as a nation in exile, and 
defined exile, in turn, as a moral trajectory of trials and tribulations that 
would ultimately empower them to reclaim (or create anew) the 
‘homeland’ of Burundi. …. Never intended as such by its architects, the 
camp had become the most central place from which to imagine a ‘pure’ 
Hutu national identity (1995:3).” (cited in: Igwara, 1995:9) 
 
This idea of “Hutu-Power” was furthermore strengthened by the Rwandan 
propaganda machinery, the radio station RTLM and the Kangura newspaper to be 
exact.  
“Hutu-Power” soon became an ideology that included, similar to National 
Socialism, psychological as well as physical features in order to create and deepen 
differences between “Them” (the Tutsi) and “Us” (the Hutu).  
For the Rwandan Hutu population the events in Burundi were the manifestation of 
their biggest fears and these events were used by the government and especially 
by the hardliners within in order to fuel the fear within the population. 
 
All the events that followed the shooting of the plane of the Rwandan president 
supposedly came as a complete surprise. After only a hundred days an estimated 
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500.000 were already dead when the killings were ended by the absolute victory 
of the RPF. 
Considering the events before 1994 it can be said that what followed the 
assassination of the Rwandan president on April 6th, 1994 did not come as a 
complete surprise. The episodes of genocidal killings that each time had cost 
thousands of lives had already shown the danger of how close the country was to 
genocide.  
These indications intensified during the months prior to the genocide and should 
have given the international community ample cause to take action, especially 
after the warnings of the leading head of the UNAMIR I, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, 
who had not only received training plans for the militia, but also information 
about illegal imports of weapons and also lists of names of future victims. In 
addition also members of numerous fact-finding missions and the special UN-
Rapporteur to Rwanda had warned about the possibility of genocide in Rwanda 
(Schabas, 2000:143). 
 
The end of the killings in Rwanda was as already mentioned above due to he 
absolute victory of the RPF, causing masses of Hutu refugees as well as the 
“génocidaires” to flee the country.  
The UN troops only played a small, even marginal role in the Rwandan conflict. 
They more or less became witnesses to the genocide, since the UNAMIR I 
(United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was only a Chapter IV mission, 
meaning the UN personel was only there to see to the implementation of the 
“Arusha Accords”.  
 
An extension of the mandate of UNAMIR I to become a Chapter VII mission 
failed mainly due to the political will of the international community to intervene, 
especially because of the “Veto” of the Veto-powers within the UN.  
One of the main reasons for the decision not to intervene was the failed US-
mission “Restore Hope” in Somalia in 1993, posing a catastrophic defeat to the 
US-American troops. Moreover, the US, for that matter, had no real political or 
economic interest in Rwanda and therefore saw no good reason to take action and 
risk another “Somalia”.  
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5.2. History and Influence of the Media 
 
As already mentioned before, the two main media for anti-Tutsi propaganda were 
the radio station RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and the 
Kangura newspaper. These two media will be introduced now and their role and 
impact will be analyzed in the following part of the paper. 
 
 
5.2.1. Kangura 
"Let us learn about the inkotanyi plans,  
and let us exterminate every last one of them."  
(Kangura magazine) 
In the issue of November 1991, a picture of a machete was on the cover of a 
newspaper called Kangura, the headline asking the question: ”What weapons shall 
we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?” (Benesch, 2004:62).  
Kangura was to become a major propaganda tool in the anti-Tutsi propaganda. In 
the years prior to the genocide Kangura had been the most widely read Rwandan 
newspaper.  
Kangura, founded by members of the Akazu, established itself next to other 
independent media in Rwanda. Whereas most of these papers struggled with hard 
restrictions of the government, Kangura did not have these problems. The paper 
soon became famous for its racist attacks against the Tutsi population and used 
terms of hate speech so naturally that it soon became the norm for the paper.  
 
Furthermore, the slogan used by Kangura was already suggesting the violent 
contents the paper published.  
In original it said: “’ijwi rigamije gukangura no kurngerea rubanda 
nyamwinshi’…”, meaning: “’the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the 
“majority people”.’” (Article 19, 1996:35).  
In addition to the violent and often explicit contents of their articles, Kangura 
underlined them with even more explicit and brutal illustrations. 
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It was also Kangura that published the “10 Hutu Commandments” (see Appendix 
page 89) in issue Number 6 in December 1990. These “10 Hutu Commandments” 
were part of an article with the headline: “Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu” 
and it stated that: 
 
“The enemy is still there, among us, and is bidding his time to try again, 
at a more propitious moment, to decimate us. Therefore, Hutu, wherever 
you may be, wake up! Be firm and vigilant. Take all necessary measures 
to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack…” (ICTR, 2003a:3). 
 
In order to make it look as if Kangura was not being one-sided and inciting anti-
Tutsi violence, Ngeze, the chief editor of Kangura and also one of the accused at 
the media trials at the ICTR, published the so called “19 Tutsi Commandments”. 
These “19 Tutsi Commandments” were “addressed” to the Tutsi population and 
called upon them to “…’show them they are incapable’, ‘ridicule the civil servants 
under our authority as ignorant Bantu people…’” amongst others – all supposedly 
directed against Hutu. Also “’…and Commandment 16 issued a special call to the 
‘youth Tutsi’, stating that if ‘we fail to achieve our goal, we will use violence’.” 
(ICTR, 2003a:4). These so called “19 Commandments” served the sole purpose of 
fuelling the fear and hate amongst the Hutu and to enforce ethnic division. They 
created an atmosphere of looming, imminent danger. 
 
Additionally the Tutsi were portrayed as “blood thirsty”, but especially the Tutsi 
women were one of the main targets of Kangura’s propaganda. Tutsi women were 
depicted as the “secret weapon” against the Hutu and Hutu men who got married 
to Tutsi women or even as much as hired a female Tutsi were branded as traitors.  
Kangura actually called for the Hutu “…to cease feeling pity for the Tutsi!” 
(ICTR, 2003a:4). Tutsi women and children were especially targeted during the 
Rwandan genocide, with the goal to make sure that there was no next generation 
attacking from Uganda. 
 
Since the illiteracy rate in Rwanda was extremely high, a radio station was 
founded in addition. It was solely created to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda 
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amongst the Rwandan population and was called “Radio Télévision Libre des 
Mille Collines” (RTLM), which means “Radio Station of the Thousand Hills”.  
After the outbreak of violence in April 1994, Kangura only played a minor role in 
spreading propaganda, since during the war the infrastructure necessary for the 
circulation of the paper did not exist anymore. 
 
 
5.2.2. Radio Télévision des Mille Collines – RTLM 
 
RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) was founded in 1993 and went 
on air in April of the same year, exactly one year prior to the outbreak of the 
genocide.  
Originally RTLM was created consisting of democratic features, which were to be 
ensured by a democratically elected board of directors. The members of this board, 
however, were never appointed.  
One of the accused at the Arusha “Media Trials”, Ferdinand Nahimana, is 
considered the main force behind the hate messages propagated by RTLM.  
It is obvious that the main goal of RTLM was the incitement of hate speech and 
ethnic division.  
The broadcasts of RTLM concentrated on the Tutsi rebels, the RPF. In the 
beginning they started by using the name of a former RPF operation: 
“Inyenzi”(“Cockroaches”). Inyenzi soon became a buzzword and the term 
“cockroaches” soon was applied to the whole Tutsi population. Furthermore all 
the deeds that were formerly ascribed to the RPF, for example being blood-thirsty 
or planning the extinction of the Hutu population, especially of Hutu women and 
children, soon devolved and became associated with the whole Tutsi population.  
Moreover, the role of the Tutsi during colonialism was used to fuel the hatred 
against the Tutsi, by equating them with the brutal former Belgian colonial power.  
 
In order to create all these prejudices, different kinds of propaganda mechanisms 
were used by RTLM and also Kangura. Those mechanisms will be analyzed in 
the following part of this paper.  
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After the presidential airplane was shot down over the Rwandan capital Kigali, the 
aggression and brutality of RTLM’s broadcasting erratically increased. It reached 
terrible heights when the radio station started broadcasting names as well as 
address lists and even called for the militia to search for certain individuals. 
Additionally RTLM was used as a tool to coordinate the Interahamwe militia 
during the genocide. 
 
What made RTLM especially dangerous was the level of legitimacy the radio 
station had reached within the population since in the evenings RTLM was also 
broadcasting through the frequency of the public Rwandan radio station, Radio 
Rwanda.  
In most African countries the radio is the one media with the highest coverage and 
in most African countries also state controlled up to now.  
One of the main reasons for the importance of the radio is the fact that many 
African countries still have extremely high rates of illiteracy.  
In the 1990ies analphabetism in Rwanda was estimated at about 70%, especially 
amongst the rural population. 
Television was not really widespread and didn’t play a major role in the 
propagation of information in Rwanda. Furthermore, radio in Africa is often 
referred to as “voice of god”, especially in the poor rural areas where illiteracy 
rates are extremely high (Article 19, 1996; Gulseth, 2004). 
 
RTLM broadcasted in two languages, in French as well as in Kinyarwanda, 
although the content that was broadcasted in Kinyarwanda, a language that is 
solely spoken in the Rwanda region, was far more explicit. The bilingual 
broadcasting also had the effect that it made the station seem more professional 
and increased the legitimacy of the station amongst the Rwandan population even 
more (Intermedia, Case Study Rwanda). 
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5.2.3. Main Goals of Kangura and RTLM 
 
The main goal of the contents broadcast by both RTLM and Kangura, was to 
create a certain enemy image. The image that was created by the media 
concentrated not only on the RPF rebels dreaded already but was also directed 
against the Tutsi population as a whole and furthermore was directed against 
Belgians as well as moderate Hutus. 
Still, the propaganda not only consisted of the creation of an enemy image, but 
also used, for example, inclusion-exclusion mechanisms. As mentioned before, 
after the death of the Rwandan president also open calls for violence became 
omnipresent in the broadcastings of RTLM. 
 
 
5.2.3.1.  Freedom of Speech and State Sovereignty -  
Jamming RTLM 
 
The Human Right to “Freedom of Speech” is one of the greatest achievements of 
our time, including not only the right of individuals to speak freely, but also the 
right to free media. The right to “Freedom of Speech” is especially valued in 
countries like the United States and also amongst Western European Countries 
and is one of the main indicators of a country’s level of democracy and 
independence.  
Still, the human right to freedom of speech reaches its limits as soon as it starts to 
interfere with more fundamental human rights such as the right to life. 
In the years prior to the genocide, and even more intensified in the months before,  
sign of the existence of hate speech in the Rwandan media became undeniable. 
Many of the delegates that visited Rwanda in the process of securing peace and 
security detected those threats and called for immediate action, nationally as well 
as internationally. An intervention not only into a state’s sovereignty but 
furthermore the incision into a valued human right, were out of question for 
international governments but also international organizations. Contrariwise, it 
even seems that the real power and influence of the media is often underestimated. 
In the case of Rwanda the propagated contents of Kangura and RTLM were either 
not taken seriously or just ignored by the international community.  
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The head of the UNAMIR I mission, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire criticized the 
contents of RTLM broadcast, but did not have the mandate to intervene 
accordingly.  
 
The Canadian ambassador to Rwanda stated about RTLM for that matter: 
 
“The question of Radio Mille Collines’ propaganda is a difficult one. 
There were so many genuinely silly things being said on the station, so 
many obvious lies, that it was hard to take seriously. It was like relying 
on the National Enquirer [a US supermarket tabloid] to determine our 
policy in outer space.”  
(Article 19, 1996:49).  
 
Not only was the professionalism behind RTLM underestimated, but also the fear 
that rooted deep in crisis-ridden Rwandan society. Despite of urgent calls of some 
human rights organizations to shut the station down, there was no real interest on 
the international level to take action against the radio. These were to follow later 
during “Opération Turquois”, when first the US and later also France tried to shut 
down the station. Before “Opération Turquois” all those ambitions failed due to 
reasons that included various technical difficulties and also arguments of 
international law, since the jamming of a station would pose a serious intrusion 
into another state’s sovereignty.  
The argumentation also included that the station was either untraceable or even 
shut down already, which was not the case. France was also concerned that they 
did not have a suitable mandate within “Opération Turquois” to take such 
measures. Therefore RTLM was able to keep on broadcasting out of the Rwandan 
refugee camps in Zaire (RSF, 1995:4). 
Some of the non-permanent members of the Security Council also called for 
action against the station. The issue of jamming of RTLM even became the 
subject of a meeting of the UN Security Council. Still, no measures were agreed 
upon.  
The country best equipped for such an operation would have been the US. The US 
government drew up an estimate of the costs of jamming the station and found 
that it would by far be too expensive. 
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“We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, 
discussed them interagency and concluded jamming as an ineffective and 
expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC 
advisor seeks. International legal conventions complicate airborne and 
ground based jamming and the mountain terrain reduces the 
effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an AIR National Guard 
asset, is the only suitable DOD jamming platform. It costs approximately 
$8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due 
to its vulnerability and limited self-protection. I believe it would be wiser 
to use air to assist in Rwanda the [food] relief effort…”  
(Power, 2001:19). 
 
During some of these meetings Prudence Bushnell, the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State at that time, tried to address the issue of “Jamming RTLM”. 
The “State Department Legal Advisors Office” concluded, though, that such an 
operation wouldn’t only pose a breach of the “International Broadcasting 
Agreements” but would also oppose the US-American understanding of the 
concept of freedom of speech (Power, 2001:19). When Bushnell still tried to push 
action against RTLM, she was then criticized by one of the members of the 
Pentagon for being naïve: ”Pru, radios don’t kill people. People kill people!” 
(Power, 2001:19f). 
 
 
5.3. The Techniques of De-Humanization 
 
5.3.1. Ethnicity as cause for conflict? 
 
Ethnicity as root of violence and also “ethnic violence” has become a kind of  
“catch-all-concept” in the past decades. Violence and warfare are often linked to 
the existence of ethnic differences. In many cases the real reasons for conflicts are 
disguised or even denied (Schlee, 2006:8). 
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“’Ethnische Konflikte’ ist, besonders seit dem Ende des Sozialismus und 
der Abkehr von seiner klassenkämpferischen Perspektive, zu einer 
selbstverständlichen Phrase geworden. Keiner fragt was eigentlich 
ethnisch an ethnischen Konflikten ist. (…) Ethnizität ist in dieser Sicht 
ein zeitkonstanter Faktor, der Konflikte generiert.“ (Schlee, 2006:8) 
 
Ethnicity is identified as the main feature and root of conflict in Rwanda by the 
international media as well as independent observers. This view has always been 
criticized sharply by specialists and researchers. 
Ethnicity as single cause of the Rwandan genocide does not uphold a closer look 
at the root of the conflict, especially, since in Rwanda only a single language and 
a collective culture are to be identified (Igwara et al, 1995). 
 
Schlee also criticizes the common theory that in an ethnic conflict “…uralte und 
tief verwurzelte Gegensätze….” (Schlee, 2006:12) collide with one another.  
Schlee finds that ethnicity is nothing constant, nothing that is unalterable, but on 
the contrary an always moving concept that is permanently redefined by the 
collective addressed. The line between “Us” and “Them” is constantly drawn 
anew (Schlee, 2006:12ff). 
 
Therefore the cause of conflict keeps also changing. In many cases these 
differences are created artificially by the people in power, for example in order to 
obtain political backup of a certain group or to explain existing inequalities 
(Maquet, 1961; Schlee 2006). 
 
“’Types’ and ‘traits’ incautiously and sometimes fanciful ascribed by 
social scientist and bureaucrats have often taken a terrible social reality 
as the reification and essentialization of cultural difference have been 
harnessed to deadly political visions.” (Igwara, 1995:7). 
 
A good example for that is again the case of the Kenyan Kalenjin that has already 
been described at the beginning (page 21).  
 
 
 
 
68
In the context of the Rwandan genocide Igwara cites Alex de Waal, who finds that: 
 
“Specialists on Rwanda protest in vain that Hutu and Tutsi are not 
separate ethnic groups. But sixty years of colonial and Tutsi rule, and 
thirty-five years of Hutu supremacy following the 1959 revolution, 
which consigned half the Tutsi population to exile, have fundamentally 
changed the nature of the relationships between them. Potential conflict, 
punctuated by intercommunal violence, has created distinct and mutually 
opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which, for all the hesitation of social 
scientists, are identifiably ‘ethnic’ (1994b:3)”  
(cited in: Igwara, 1995:2) 
 
It also has to be considered that an ethnic group is nothing with a fixed external 
frontier, but something that changes in the eye of the beholder. There are some 
cases in Africa, where members of different tribes and in more extreme cases even 
from different language families align to a clan (Schlee, 2006:13ff). 
 
In the Rwandan case language as cause for disparity can be excluded, since only a 
single language is spoken by the Rwandan people. Therefore other mechanisms 
were used in order to create differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Once 
more it has to be stated that in reality this did not only include people with the 
ascription “Tutsi” in their passes, especially since differences of physical features, 
had become nearly extinct. The name “Tutsi” also included Belgian nationals as 
well as those Hutu that seemed not to meet the perception of the “optimal Hutu”. 
The assertion of Hutu as “Tutsi” was based on political affiliations, sometimes 
even physical features, but also on success or wealth (Igwara, 1995). Many of the 
victims were also moderate Hutu, who were opposed to the violence or/and 
separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69
5.3.2. Enemy images and the Rwandan genocide 
 
The question that is inevitable when talking about genocide and has already been 
addressed earlier in this paper is the question of how such atrocities are at all even 
possible.  
As cited earlier, the answer the genocide researchers Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) 
give, is that genocide can not be possible, as long as the potential victims are still 
thought of as equal human beings. During genocide its victims are never viewed 
as equal, in many cases not even as humans. Before and during genocide the 
humanity of the victims is deconstructed – in parts or even in whole – by those 
who then become the perpetrators.  
Chalk furthermore argues that humans always had names for themselves, such as 
humankind, people, etc. These names are related to the attributes that are 
identified with these groups. These can be connected to things like religion, 
language, ethnicity, etc. People who are excluded from such a group are often 
associated with certain (in many cases even fictional) characteristics, such as 
witches, savages, or even animals by which this group or individual is 
dehumanized.  
Still, in order for such a cruel event as genocide to happen, the responsible actors 
first have to define the group of victims and then make them seem worthless, 
dangerous or even not human.  
In order to establish the dehumanization of the Tutsi, the Rwandan government 
used the media openly and also massively. These dehumanization mechanisms in 
the Rwandan media will be examined in the following chapters in order to 
establish how they were used in Rwanda. 
 
Furthermore, there are other things necessary for genocide to happen, such as 
centralized, undemocratic and semi-bureaucratic features of a state.  
 
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) define four criteria of genocide. In most of the 
previous genocides more than one of these features could be identified.  
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“1. to eliminate a real or potential threat; 
2. to spread terror among real or potential enemies; 
3. to acquire economic wealth; or 
4. to implement a belief, a theory or an ideology.”  
(Chalk, 1990:29) 
 
 
5.3.3. The necessity of inclusion and exclusion 
 
Schlee (2006) distinguishes two different kinds of conflict in his book “Wie 
Feindbilder entstehen” on the basis of Machiavelli’s theories. 
The first and most brutal and desperate form of violence is defined – in relation to 
Machiavelli’s theories – the fight for survival of a population, as they were for 
example found in Europe in the past. During these conflicts it was possible that 
after the occupation of a national territory its population was either displaced or 
even exterminated (e.g. the Gauls).  
In the second form of conflict Schlee finds that there are different kinds of reasons 
to be found, such as political or economic power. He furthermore states that in 
these conflicts the “Prinzip der minimal winning coalition” applies. This principle 
means that only so many supporters are acquired as are necessary to take over 
power – therefore not having to share it with too many others. Due to this 
principle, alliances are formed by including people for one’s cause by creating and 
defining communalities. Collective goals are used to define new and common 
characteristics. Therefore a lack of resources, such as water, but also other reasons 
such as the striving for political supremacy can lead to the creation of 
communality or disparity and furthermore even lead to bloody conflicts (Schlee, 
2006). 
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5.4. Enemy Images and the Creation of Enemy Images 
 
5.4.1. The Construction of “the Others” – Techniques of Anti-Tutsi 
Propaganda 
 
The usage of highly emotional language, in order to provoke intense emotions 
amongst its audience was characteristic of the contents that were broadcasted by 
RTLM. The staff of RTLM used different techniques, such as intonation or the 
description of one’s “good intentions” versus the “other’s bad and evil intentions”, 
e.g. by describing them as “wicked savages” who had the sole plan to kill 
innocent (Hutu) people (RTLM May 23rd, 1994). 
RTLM was also preferred amongst the population to the state owned Radio 
Rwanda, since its program did not consist of long newscasts and reports, but 
played a lot of (Rwandan) contemporary music.  
Anti-Tutsi propaganda was spread through the lyrics of the music that was aired 
on RTLM.  
One of the musicians, Simon Bikindi was also accused of inciting hate speech at 
the ICTR in Arusha. Bikindi for example wrote the hit-song “I hate these Tutsi”, 
which was sung in Kinyarwanda (original title: “Nanga Abahutu”). Simon Bikindi 
was, amongst other counts, accused of “Conspiracy and Complicity to Genocide” 
(Trial Watch – Simon Bikindi). His case created a fierce debate about the freedom 
of speech and even more so about the freedom of arts (Gulseth, 2004).  
Many researchers who address the topic of propaganda in Africa state that music 
can be used as a very effective tool for propaganda, since music plays a very 
special and exclusive role in all of Africa. These forms of propaganda can also be 
found in other African nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, 
former Zaire), Congo-Brazzaville or Cameroon.  
The anti-Tutsi songs of Bikindi were to be heard several times a day on RTLM. 
The colourful program of RTLM consisted of a lot of music with short comments 
of the host in between, as well as short interviews. This form of program 
especially attracted the young male population (Internews – Case Study Rwanda). 
 
The actual effectiveness and power of RTLM are debatable. Still, it is agreed that 
the broadcasts were used as a heavy propaganda tool, but there was no status quo 
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on the actual consequences. It has to be stated though, that the broadcasts alone 
would not have sufficed in order to provoke the outbreaks of violence and 
genocide. RTLM and also Kangura probably did not cause the violence to 
explode with their broadcasts and articles – but still they both provided a powerful 
tool and also justifications for the violence that was about to follow (Gulseth, 
2004).  
Violence in the end would also have broken out without the existence of RTLM or 
Kangura. But the enormous amount of hate that had built up after all those years 
of anti-Tutsi agitations is likely to be responsible for the extremely bloody and 
violent form the genocide took (Gulseth, 2004:28).  
It was also the goal of the propaganda in Rwanda to create and provide “’the 
audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with a social 
and political reality.’” (cited in: Gulseth, 2004:32). Propaganda, especially in the 
context of the Rwandan genocide, can not be viewed as an isolated event but has 
to be put in context with the political, social and historical structures that can be 
identified in Rwanda, but also in the neighbouring state Burundi at that time. 
 
 
5.4.2. Stereotypes, Prejudice and Concepts of the Enemy –  
“Us” against the “Others” 
 
An important propaganda mechanism were the inclusion (“Us”) and exclusion 
(“Them, the Others”) strategies as they were used by both, by RTLM as well as by 
Kangura. This meant that there were positive features and strengths attributed to 
everybody included in the term “Us” (the Hutu) in order to strengthen the unity of 
the Hutu. The usage of hate speech against “Them” (the Tutsi) and therefore the 
creation of a common enemy were again multiplied by stereotypes (Gulseth, 
2004:37). Not only physical features were used accordingly but also colonial 
history.  
 
In order to create such a concept of an enemy seven characteristics necessary for 
propaganda were defined by Spillman and Spillman (1991:57): 1. Distrust; 2. 
Allocation of Blame; 3. Negative Anticipation; 4. Identification with Evil; 5. 
Zero-Sum thinking (everything that is bad for the enemy is good for us and vice-
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versa); 6. Deconstructing the Individual; 7. Refusal of Compassion (Gulseth, 
2004:42). 
RTLM and Kangura only identified the Tutsi with negative features, their 
reporting about the Tutsi made them seem inhuman, since they were only 
associated with negative features and/or events. 
 
“…Rwandan hate radio sought to demonize and ‘dehumanize’ Tutsi in 
order to create the impression that killing was not akin killing other 
humans, thus making the act somehow more acceptable and easier to 
carry out.”  
(Gulseth, 2004:43) 
 
Some of the journalists, especially those working for RTLM were also quite 
skilled, so it can be considered a fact that they knew what they were doing 
(Gulseth, 2004:42). They used the concept of “the enemy” for their own intentions, 
as Sam Keen also describes in his book “Faces of the enemy” (Gulseth, 2004:41). 
 
“’In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the 
image. We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the 
ballistic missiles with which we actually kill them. Propaganda precedes 
technology’, Sam Keen (1986:10)…”  
(cited in: Gulseth, 2004:41). 
 
 
5.4.3. Blaming “the Other” – The creation of a Scapegoat 
 
Another thing was that it was also common to blame “the Tutsi” for all the 
shortcomings and problems, such as the catastrophic shape of the Rwandan 
economy. As already mentioned, history and colonial past were also popular 
propaganda tools. When broadcasting contents about the colonial past of Rwanda 
not only the Belgians but especially the role of the Tutsi was decried.  
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RTLM for example broadcasted that:  
 
“’These people [the Inkontanyi] and all the other accomplices in the 
country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes’ 
(RTLM April 12th, 1994).”  
(cited in: Gulseth, 2004:46). 
 
 
5.4.4. The Danger and Threat posed by “the Others” 
 
Furthermore, the events that took place at the same time in Burundi are not to be 
forgotten since they had a deep impact on the Rwandan every day politics. In this 
case the massacres that took place after the assassination of the Burundian 
president in 1993 are of special significance. The attacks by Tutsi on the Hutu 
people in Burundi were exploited not only to generate a lot of public attention but 
mainly in order to fuel the fear within the Rwandan Hutu population.  
Additionally, some of the attacks on Hutus in Rwanda that were ascribed to the 
RPF are thought to have actually been carried out by the Rwandan presidential 
guard itself, in order to stoke the fear within the population (Dallaire, 2003). 
 
“Die Wahrnehmung des Anderen als Bedrohung, als Repräsentant 
fremder und Destruktiver Kräfte, ist allen nationalistischen, autoritären 
und totalitären Regimen unererer Epoche gemeinsam. Sie ist ein 
universelles, kulturunabhängiges Phänomen. Keine Zivilisation war in 
der Lage sich des (con den verschiedenen Machthabern in allen 
Breitangraden propagierten) pathologischen Hasses, der Verachtung und 
der Zerstörung zu widersetzen. Im Extremfall hat diese krankhafte 
Entwicklung die unheilvolle Form des Völkermordes angenommen – 
einer der wiederkehrenden tragischen Züge unserer heutigen 
Welt.“ (Kapuscinski, 16.03.2001) 
 
Especially cruel stories of atrocities allegedly committed by the RPF were later 
really comitted by the Hutu militias the Interahamwe. The stories about the 
alleged atrocities committed by the RPF were another mechanism to dehumanize 
them further and make the RPF seem like unrivalled bloodthirsty animals. One of 
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these fabricated stories broadcast by RTLM stated that RPF soldiers cut out a 
pregnant woman’s child and then forced her to cook it for the soldiers (Intermedia, 
Case Study Rwanda). Later it was proved that the story was invented by RTLM 
through broadcasting an interview with a fake witness.  
The tragic fact about that is that this story should then become reality during the 
genocide in 1994. Such atrocities as cutting out the foetuses of pregnant women 
were committed later by the Interahamwe militia during the genocide (Kressel 
1996, Dallaire 2003). 
 
 
5.4.5. The Construction of “the Others Intentions” 
 
In addition to praising their own journalistic qualities and political knowledge the 
journalists of Kangura as well as RTLM also depicted the “obvious evil 
intentions” of the Tutsi people in their reporting. The journalists legitimated their 
views and assertions with both their history and their education, such as university 
degrees. 
They always predicted violent acts that were planned by the RPF. These – in 
many cases false – news items were accompanied by false interviews and 
unproven assertions from the journalists as well as their recipients.  
The audience was included in the program by having the possibility of calling the 
radio station and stating their thoughts and views on the political situation or on 
anti-Tutsi topics.  These calls were often fiery speeches about the threat that “the 
Tutsi” posed to Rwanda and “the Hutus”. 
 
Especially during the peace negotiations between the Rwandan government and 
the RPF in Arusha the commentators highlighted that the plan of the RPF was not 
to enter into a democratic political system, but to conquer the country and to 
establish a RPF led rule. This furthermore fuelled the insecurity about the political 
events that took place outside as well as within Rwanda. 
 
“’… the party using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror. With 
such tactics, propagandists can persuade listeners and ‘honest people’ 
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that they were being attacked and are justified in taking whatever 
measures are necessary for legitimate self-defence’”  
(Gulseth, 2004:45) 
 
The Anti-Tutsi hatred had already claimed many lives before the genocide of 
1994 ever took place, for example in the case of the Bugesera massacres in 1992. 
Already then the Hutu extremists had managed to implement the belief in the local 
population that the main goal of the Tutsi was to extinguish all Hutu people. This 
alleged “plan of extinction of the Hutus by the Tutsi” was the most frightening 
part of the anti-Tutsi propaganda that preceded and accompanied the genocide 
(Gulseth, 2004). 
 
 
5.4.6. The Tactics of “Name-Giving” 
 
The tactic of “name-giving” became an especially efficient tool of anti-Tutsi 
propaganda.  
The most popular names were, for example, “Inyenzi” meaning “Cockroaches”, 
“Inkontanyi” meaning “family of killers”, just to name the two most common 
expressions (Gulseth, 2004:78ff). At first these names were only ascribed to 
members of the RPF, but soon were used for the all the Tutsi people. This was 
possible due to permanent repetitions and connection of the RPF and the Tutsi as 
a whole.  
Typically, only names with bad associations were used. This meant that the Tutsi 
were called names like: animals, killers, dictators, terrorists, criminals, contract-
killers, army, etc. in order to create fear and hate amongst the population. The 
goal was to motivate the Hutu population to take action against the “looming 
attack of the Tutsis”.  
“Name-calling” is an important tactic of de-humanizing a group of people as well 
as individuals. 
As already mentioned before, these potential attacks of the RPF were sometimes 
exaggerated – or in the worst cases even created – by the journalists of RTLM and 
Kangura.  
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When they created rumours of attacks or reported about attacks they often used 
fake eye-witnesses and cited false sources.  
The role of the Tutsi during the Rwandan history, especially during colonisation 
was also used to portray the Tutsi as adherents to feudal structures, who 
supposedly had one main goal: to seize power again and subject the Hutu people 
to slavery.  
Additionally, the fact that the RPF consisted mainly of very young men and the 
fact that many of them had been born in exile and often didn’t even speak 
Kinyarwanda or even French was used as a factor to depict the RPF as a foreign 
terrorist group with no connection or right to return to Rwanda (Gulseth, 
2004:98ff). 
 
 
5.4.7. Public Calls for Violence 
 
Today the role and influence of RTLM during the genocide is widely 
acknowledged. This is not only due to the numerous reports and papers on the 
topic but furthermore also acknowledged by the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, where some of the persons responsible were prosecuted and found guilty. 
These cases shall be discussed in the paper later on.  
The moderators of RTLM not only inflicted hatred through their reporting, but 
after the outbreak of the genocide even called for violence and murder openly. 
 
“’ During the genocide, it [RTLM] became what one listener at the time 
called ‘vampire radio’ openly calling for more blood and massacres`”  
(Gulseth, 2004:50). 
 
It furthermore became typical of RTLM to attack certain individuals personally. 
Next to general denunciations of the RPF, the Tutsi and everybody else that was 
considered close to the Tutsi, direct attacks against individuals such as priests, 
doctors, etc. became very common in the reports of RTLM.  
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RTLM defended itself against criticism by stating:  
 
“…The read on why our radio surprises you is because you were not 
used to this kind of talk on Radio Rwanda. We can understand that this is 
why you hear people complaining: ‘RTLM is talking about me!’ It will 
say even more. Now we are just making you familiar. We will keep on 
increasing, increasing.”  
(Article 19, 1996:54) 
 
A good example for these kinds of practices was the direct attack against the 
liberal Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in December 1993: 
 
“The Prime-Minister has created a bad atmosphere because she co-
operates with the RPF. She should remember that the scar she has was 
previously a wound.” (Article 19, 1996:54) 
 
Such threats against the Prime Minister were repeatedly transmitted by RTLM, 
furthermore stating that she should not forget that she was not an immortal 
(Article 19, 1996:54).  
The Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana finally was to become one of the first 
victims of the Rwandan genocide.  
Alongside her ten Belgian UN blue helmets died who were supposed to protect 
her (Dallaire, 2003). The killings of these blue helmets posed the main reason for 
Belgium to pull its troops out of Rwanda. Belgium had supported UNAMIR I 
with the most troops and resources until that point. 
 
RTLM often recited “scientific” papers and transmitted public speeches of León 
Mugesera. Mugesera was vice-president of the MDR and held anti-Tutsi rallies all 
over the country on regular bases. Furthermore, his position as a leading politician 
in Rwanda granted the contents of his hate-speeches a special form of 
legitimization. Parts of his speeches were constantly repeated on RTLM.  
The fact that during the genocide many of the corpses were thrown into the 
Nyaborongo River is also accredited to Mugesera’s speeches, since in one of them 
he states that: 
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“’Should (sic!) justice system fail to carry out the punishment, Mugesera 
explained, people needed to take the law into their own hands as justice 
was executed ‘in the name of the people’. – invoking religious authority, 
Mugesera also incited genocide against the Tutsi: ‘we ourselves will take 
care of massacring these gangs of thugs. You know, it says in the Gospel 
that the snake comes to bite you and, if you let it stay, you are the one 
who will perish.’ He concluded: ‘the mistake we made in 1959 … is that 
what let you [the Tutsi – notation of the author] get out safe and sound… 
your country is Ethiopia and, soon, we will send you home via 
Nyaborongo [river in Rwanda], on an express trip`.” (Article 19, 
1996:19). 
 
The contents of his speech are very direct and, as already mentioned, closely 
connected to the thousands of bodies that were to be found in the Nyaborongo 
River during the genocide.  It was also often repeated by other politicians and also 
by the journalists of RTLM.  
Mugesera himself never committed any direct act of violence or killings, his 
crimes were solely committed through his speeches. He had already left Rwanda 
one year before the genocide started.  
Still, he was also named as one of the people responsible for the Rwandan 
genocide by the International Tribunal for Rwanda during the case Prosecutor vs. 
Akayesu (Schabas, 2000:144). 
 
 
5.5. The Possible Reasons for the Extreme Influence of Propaganda in 
Rwanda 
 
The propaganda and hate speech that was incited through reports of RTLM as 
well as Kangura obviously played a major role during the genocide in Rwanda, 
mainly due to the high acceptance that these topics received by its recipients, 
especially in the case of RTLM. 
As described above, one of the main reasons for the high acceptance of RTLM is 
considered the high rate of illiteracy amongst the Rwandan population, especially 
in the rural areas. Stories and rumours always played an important role amongst 
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the rural population, news still mainly travelled through mouth-to-mouth 
propaganda in many African countries.  
For many people stories and rumours are legitimate sources of information and to 
even question facts and reports that were broadcast by the media would have 
seemed strange and in most cases would have been impossible anyway. This is 
one of the main reasons why the reports and stories that were broadcasted on 
RTLM were absorbed without questioning in many cases.  
Furthermore, since many of the politicians and prominent persons such as singers 
and community leaders also repeated these contents publicly, rumours became 
truth (Kressel, 1996). 
 
Even more so, the practice of permanently repeating certain names and 
expressions made the whole effect of propagated contents become even stronger 
and sink deep into people’s minds. Kotnik (1997) and Brown (1963) both stated 
that the permanent repetition of certain words, phrases or names is one of the most 
effective and intense forms of propaganda techniques, since it does not create 
topics for discussion or possible distrust, but simply blends into the minds and 
vocabulary of the audience (Gulseth, 2004:51).  
 
 
5.6. Excursion – Hate Speech and the “International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda” 
 
The “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda” (ICTR), situated in Arusha, 
Tanzania, is prosecuting the main perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide to this day.  
 
 
5.6.1. The Accused 
 
At the so called “Media Trials” three people were accused and tried by the ICTR. 
These cases, the individuals, the accusations and the verdicts are to be presented 
in the following part of the paper. 
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Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was not only a high-ranking member of the MDR but 
also one of the founders of the “Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines”. The 
accusations against Barayagwiza included that he had chaired in numerous 
meetings where the assassinations of not only Tutsi but also moderate Hutu had 
been discussed and also planned. At those meetings the funding of the 
Interahamwe was also discussed, as well as the distribution of weapons to the 
members of Interahamwe militia.  
 
Another count of accusations against Barayagwiza was that RTLM was founded 
mainly to broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda with the purpose of deepening the 
ethnic division between Hutus and Tutsis and also to enforce the violence against 
the Tutsi.  
Barayagwiza was accused on counts that included: “…conspiracy to commit 
genocide, genocide, complicity to genocide, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, as well as crimes against humanity and serious violations of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II…”  
(ICTR, 2003b). He pleaded not guilty to all counts. 
 
The second accused was Hassan Ngeze, the chief editor of the Kangura 
newspaper. Ngeze is considered responsible for many of the anti-Tutsi articles 
that were published in Kangura. Furthermore, he also held political power in the 
Interahamwe militia, the forces that were considered to have been one of the main 
actors in the killings of civilians during the genocide.  
Ngeze was accused of having authorized the publishing of contents that had the 
main goal of creating ethnic tension and violence and in addition even called for 
more brutality and inhumanity.  
One of the accusations also included that the publishing of explicit violence in 
Kangura had led to direct forms of physical as well as psychological violence. 
These accusations were evidenced through articles that were published in 
Kangura, including not only comments and cartoons, but also names and personal 
details about people who were considered as the enemy and therefore supposed to 
be assassinated. Those cartoons just mentioned also displayed an unbelievable 
grade of brutality, harassment and violence. Ngeze was accused in seven counts 
by the ICTR that included: “…conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, 
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complicity to genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and 
crimes against humanity…” (ICTR, 2003b). 
 
The third accused was Ferdinand Nahimana, who was a professor of history at the 
National University for Rwanda, located in Butare. He was also one of the 
founders of RTLM.  
The accusations that were brought against him also included the broadcasting of 
hate messages that called for the killings of Tutsis and the incitement of ethnic 
violence. Moreover, he had called on the youth to organize themselves in armed 
self-defence groups in order to fight against the RPF.  
Like Barayagwiza, he chaired meetings where the assassination of Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu was discussed and had also played a major role in the distribution 
of arms to the Interahamwe militia.  
Nahimana had also published articles, books, essays and a dissertation that 
delivered the ideological background for the 1994 genocide.  
He was accused on the same seven counts as Ngeze (ICTR, 2003b) 
 
 
5.6.2. The Verdict 
 
The ICTR found Nahimana as well as Ngeze unanimously guilty on five counts 
and not guilty on two and both received a life sentence. 
The verdict was as follows: 
 
“Count 1: Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide 
Count 2: Guilty of Genocide 
Count 3: Guilty of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide 
Count 4: Not Guilty of Complicity in Genocide 
Count 5: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution) 
Count 6: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Extermination) 
Count 7 Not Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Murder)” 
(ICTR, 2003a:28)  
 
The third accused, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was also found guilty on the same 
five counts as Nahimana and Ngeze and was furthermore found “…not guilty in 
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the two counts of Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II…” (ICTR, 2003a:30). Barayagwiza 
also received a life sentence, but the verdict was reduced to 27 years by the 
Appeals Chamber, since his rights had been violated during his imprisonment and 
transfer to Arusha (ICTR, 2003a:30) 
 
The – arguably – most important case that preceded the media trials was the case 
against the German Julius Streicher at the “Nürnberger Prozess”.  
Streicher published the newspaper “Der Stürmer” during the Second World War. 
His paper had also called for violence and he had published racist and anti-Semitic 
contents.  
It was the first time that a journalist was held responsible for publishing contents 
that called for violence while never being directly involved in the actual violence. 
The “Nürnberger Tribunal” found that:  
 
“… die Tatsache,  dass Streicher zu Mord und Ausrottung aufhetzte, in einer 
Zeit, in der Juden im Osten unter unbeschreiblichen Umständen massakriert 
wurden, offensichtlich eine Verfolgung aufgrund politischer und rassistischer 
Gründe dar, in Verbindung mit Kriegsverbrechen im Sinne des Status und ein 
Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit.”  
(Jewish Virtual Library) 
 
 
5.7. An Evaluation of the Role of the Media in Rwanda 
 
Despite being officially independent RTLM and Kangura can be clearly attributed 
to the Hutu power elite from the north of Rwanda and are closely connected to 
members of the “Akazu” and the MDR. All the accused of the “Media Trials” 
were not only involved in the propagation of hate speech and anti-Tutsi 
propaganda, but were also high ranking political actors and all three of them were 
actively involved in the planning of how to execute of the killings.  
Furthermore, both of the two media lacked democratic structures and recruited 
their journalists and publishers from within the Hutu extremists, therefore both of 
them were strongly involved in the broadcasting of anti-Tutsi propaganda. 
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When analysing the contents that were published by Kangura and RTLM and also 
the verdicts of the ICTR’s “Media Trials”, one can see that both of them were 
important instruments in the creation of an anti-Tutsi sentiment and a 
fundamentalist Hutu ideology. 
Kangura, but even more so RTLM created the framework for actions that are by 
no means justifiable. They did so by creating an enemy concept that rooted deep 
in the society’s minds and fears. Not only had the propaganda laid the 
groundwork that violence seemingly can be justified, but had even made it seem 
necessary in order to survive.  
Although the media were one of the main creators of anti-Tutsi hatred and ethnic 
division it was not the sole activator for the genocide.  
History, the struggle for political power and the dramatic state of the Rwandan 
economy were also major factors for the insecurity and fear that was found within 
the Rwandan population.  
Instead of trying to minimize these fears the government, RTLM and Kangura 
used them for their own intentions. 
The final trigger for the outbreak of the violence was the assassination of the 
president, although up to this day it is not really sure who was really behind it – if 
it was the RPF rebel or the hardliners within the government. In order of being 
able to understand the shock that was connected with the killing of the Rwandan 
president, one once again has to take the events that took place in Burundi into 
consideration. Still, as already mentioned, the political (Arusha Accords, 
democratic transition, etc) and economic (high rates of unemployed, massive 
inflation, etc.) developments were the main cause for the high acceptance of hate 
speech and violence.  
 
To this day there are discussions going on about the right to freedom of speech 
and free media. One of the main discussion points is still the decision not to jam 
the radio station RTLM. Especially in the United States there are many groups 
and organizations to be found that advocate for free speech and free media, no 
matter what. Others are a little more moderate in their views and admit that after 
the events of April 6th, 1994 the radio station should have been shut down, since it 
additionally became a tool for the coordination of the genocide.  
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Many organizations think that hate speech and the abuse of free speech are best 
met by the broadcasting of counter information instead of censorship or jamming 
of the media. There is a justified fear that jamming such a station might even have 
the opposite effect since it might create the feeling amongst its audience that their 
own freedom (of speech) and independence is at stake (Gulseth 2004). 
 
5.8. Freedom of Speech in Rwanda Today 
The abuse of the power of the media before and during the genocide left the 
Rwandan society with a deep mistrust towards the media. In the name of freedom 
of speech Kangura and even more so RTLM had incited hate speech and called 
for the assassinations of thousands of people – a legacy that is not easily 
forgotten.  
These events have had a serious impact on the media scene in Rwanda today.  
Only in 2004, ten years after the genocide, the first private radio station was 
permitted by the Rwandan government. The first ten years after the genocide there 
was only one state controlled station and a handful of foreign stations such as the 
BBC. Free media are hardly to be found in Rwanda, opposition media are state 
controlled and have to follow strict censorship rules.  
The role of the media during the genocide offers a seemingly legitimate reason for 
the acting government to put restrictions on the media and to keep it under their 
control, even more so since in the refugee camps that still exist in the neighboring 
countries, especially in the DRC, there are still active Hutu extremists who have 
not given up on the plan of returning to Rwanda and re-seizing political power 
(Gulseth, 2004).  
RTLM managed to keep on broadcasting out of the refugee camps until 1996. It 
took two more years, before RTLM was finally jammed by the Burundian 
government (Internews Rwanda). 
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6. Conclusion 
As the paper has shown, the events in Rwanda were highly organized and (state) 
controlled. Genocide, as it was argued  earlier, requires state structure and 
organization since genocide is not an event that happens by accident. Military 
training, the import of weapons and especially the efficient use of the media for 
propaganda shows that the Rwandan state still posessed enough features of a 
functioning state. In Rwanda even during and after the genocide strong features of 
state led organization can be detected.  
The alert points before the genocide also were unmistakable and the role of the 
international community is up until today cause for discussion. The killings 
initially were portrayed as tribal fightings, especially in the international media. A 
fact that can be denied. Rwandan society slid into a collective eruption of violence, 
as it is depicted also in connection with state failure, that is true. Still, this 
collective explosion of violence was still organized and controlled by a certain 
part of the state and included infrastructures like media and military.  
“…, just as ‘tribalism’ is being reaffirmed by the media as the bane of 
the continent, Rwanda’s descent into hell makes it a society not unlike 
others in Europe or Asia where genocide has been intrinsic to their recent 
historical experience.” (Lemarchand, 1995:59) 
Dozens of papers have been published, examinating the inteligence that some 
states might have had. Also there were reports published before the genocide 
warning about a possible catastrophe.  
When the RPF seized control over Rwanda after their absolute victory against the 
Hutu extremists, they again quickly introduced structures that identify a state.  
But the extremists who fled the country alongside thousands of Hutu refugees also 
managed to re-organize themselves in the camps and still operate out of those 
camps, mainly from the DRC.  
Rwanda has possessed strong features of neo-patrimonialism but it cannot be 
considered a failed state per se. Most of the structures never ceased to exist and 
the grade of organization of both of the conflict parties is rather high.  
Mainly clientelism can be identified in Rwanda prior, but also as shown in chapter 
2.3.4.1., after the genocide. Not only the governing group of the “Akazu” showed 
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strong clientelistic features, also the governing group today is closely connected to 
former-RPF members.  
Other neo-patrimonial features, such as corruption or personal rule are not too 
common. 
The genocide in Rwanda roots deep in history, but was in the end still artificially 
created. First the diversion was deepened by the Germans, who favoured the Tutsi 
and later by the Belgians who tried to change this imbalance by reversing the 
power artificially and furthermore strengthening the divide through the adoption 
of the identity cards. After independence the balance or Rwandan society 
deteriorated even further due to the additional power struggle between the Hutu 
from the north and the south, already leading to the first massacres. 
After gaining power the Rwandan government planned on keeping it and the 
creation of a common enemy were of course very helpful. The enemy was created 
and fear was deepened through the usage of propaganda as it was thoroughly 
depicted in this paper. 
One point that also becomes very obvious when looking at the history of the 
Rwandan media is, that the power and danger of the media and propaganda is up 
until this point still not really recognized. No one in the international and in many 
cases not even the people in Rwanda really believed the influence hate speech can 
have. Just as during the Holocaust and other genocides, it still seems hard for the 
outside world to grasp the reality of atrocities that take place, since they seem too 
cruel to be real. 
The most important event that precedes genocide is as discussed in chapter 4.1.2. 
the dehumanization of the victims. The Tutsi and everyone else who was opposed 
to the ideas of the ruling elite were dehumanized by the Rwanda media for years, 
in many cases in such an open and direct form, that nobody really thought this 
could be believed by anyone. This is, as long as you ignore the events that took 
place during that time in Rwanda and build the framework for the events that were 
about to follow. 
While the events that took place in Rwanda prior and during the genocide might 
present features of state failure, but in the end genocide denies state failure since it 
needs the framework of a (at least partially) working state to take place in this 
extent. Also the usage of the media and the very specific creation of enemy 
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images and future victims show that a state failure cannot have taken place in 
Rwanda. 
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7.  The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’  
as published in Kangura, No. 6 (December 1990) 
 
1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working 
for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
- Acquires a Tutsi wife; 
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine; 
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée. 
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more 
conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren‟t they lovely, excellent 
secretaries, and more honest! 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons 
see reason. 
4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is 
ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In 
consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi 
- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise 
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi 
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, public 
markets...) 
5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and 
security must be restricted to the Hutu. 
6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, 
scholars, and teachers). 
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has 
taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman. 
8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi. 
9. Hutu wherever they be must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the 
fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly 
search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu 
brothers. 
Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda. 
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Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi. 
46 
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu 
Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word 
wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and 
teaching this ideology is a traitor. 
(Quelle: http://www.trumanwebdesign.com/~catalina/commandments.htm) 
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2001-2005:  Organisation des jährlichen 
„SummerRise“ Benefizevent   
2003-2004:     Promotion und Hosting für die Agentur PEP 
September/Oktober 2002:   Promotion-Tour durch Österreich für die Firma 
OPEL 
10/2002 Promotion & Hosting für diverse Events des 
Magazins GEWINN 
2001/2002    Diverse Tätigkeiten für die Eventabteilung der 
NEWS Gruppe 
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Sommer/Herbst 2001 Hosting von Präsentationen zum Launch der 
neuen Zeitschrift WOMAN 
2000     Im Verkauf bei MANGO 
1998-1999    für das Meinungsforschungsinstitut INTEGRAL 
Sommer 1997/1998   Ordinationshilfe für Dr. Christine Eisterer 
 
Sprachkenntnisse 
German    Muttersprache 
English     Fließend; TOEFL (iBT) score: 112 
French     Grundlagen 
 
 
Computerkenntnisse 
Kenntnisse der gängigen Softwareprogramme (Windows): Microsoft Word, Excel, Power 
Point, sowie das Lotus database programme und Grundkenntnisse folgender Programme: 
Adobe Writer, Adobe Premiere, Studio DV, Adobe Indesign and Adobe Photoshop. 
 
 
 
Weitere Aktivitäten 
Aug ´06: Teilnahme am “Vienna International Model 
United Nations” (VIMUN) als Vertreter für 
Uganda beim CCPCJ zu dem Thema 
“Trafficking Small Arms and Light Weapons” 
Seit ´06: Mitglied der “United Nations Youth and Student 
Association of Austria- Academic Forum for 
Foreign Affairs” (UNYSA- AUSTRIA-AFA) 
und Amnesty International (Working group on 
Western Africa and China) 
Feb. ´06: Rhetorik-Workshop (Basiskurs) 
Sommer ´01: Reise nach Jamaika, organisiert vom Institut für 
Geschichte der Universität Wien 
Frühling´01     Konversationskurs am Institut Francais, Vienna  
März ´99:     Sprachreise nach Frankreich (Paris/Cannes) 
Feb. ´99:  Teilnahme am 1. “Model of United Nations 
General Assembly” in Kooperation mit South 
Africa 
Sommer ´96:    Sprachreise nach England  
 
 
 
